STRUCTURE AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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BEFORE THE

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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1318, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Warner, Denton, and Nunn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Anthony J. Principi, counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, and José F. Martinez, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker and Mary A. Shields, research assistants; and Jacquie S. O'Grady, staff assistant.

Also present: Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Cynthia Taylor, assistant to Senator Levin; and Alan Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. I am very pleased to welcome to the committee, Representative Richard White, the chairman of the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee, Gen. David Jones, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Admiral Holloway, former Chief of Naval Operations.

After this part of this morning's meeting, we will hear testimony from Mr. Thomas E. Cooper, who has been nominated by the President to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development, and Logistics.

Earlier this year, General Jones and Gen. Edward C. Meyer publicly described several shortcomings in the current structure and operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their recommendations for correcting these problems and the views of more than 40 witnesses were evaluated by Representative White and the Investigations Subcommittee. The eventual results was passage by the House of H.R. 6954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982.

My colleagues and I consider this issue to the extremely important. It deserves our careful review. The hearing totally formally initiates that review, which will be continued with further hearings during the 98th Congress.

I would like to suggest the following procedure for this morning's session. First, I will ask Congressman White to present his oral statement and take questions from committee members. Then I will ask General Jones, General Taylor, and Admiral Holloway to come forward as a panel. The committee would then be able to question them together after each of them has orally presented his views.

First, I want to welcome to the committee my distinguished colleague from the State of Texas, Dick White, with whom it has been my pleasure to work over the years. Dick has been a very valued member of the House Armed Services Committee, and, unfortunately, is retiring at the end of this Congress.

Dick, would you come forward? We welcome you here today and we look forward to hearing what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD C. WHITE, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Representative **White.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for holding these hearings.

This is, indeed, an extremely important factor in the defense posture of our Nation. And it came to our attention, the Armed Services Committee, when General Jones courageously spoke out indicating some shortcomings in the present system.

It was very apparent to the members of the Armed Services Committee Investigations Subcommittee that what we were addressing was not, in any manner, a failure on the parts of the individuals because there is no doubt what the caliber of joint chiefs of staff and those who serve them is, and that they have honorably served their country. But the system itself has pitfalls collectively which derogate against crisp advice, which is their primary purpose, for the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense.

General Jones suggested a number of very sweeping changes, among those, as General Jones will undoubtedly testify, is that the Chairman be made principal advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, and that he have a Deputy Chairman because of the multiplicity of demands and duties and the competition for time and so forth. And he spoke about the Staff, which I will address, too.

General Meyer came forward and said yes, there are some serious flaws in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system and that, indeed, there are needed changes. He suggested that there be a divorce between the duties of the service chiefs and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be actually isolated or insulated from their duties as service chiefs. The committee did not go that far because the committee in passing out the bill, determined that it was important that those who have the duties of developing a budget and the strategy for the respective services also have the duty and responsibility of implementation.

We thought that by severing that relationship, we would not be making timely and as knowledgeable decisions, so we kept that unity between the service chiefs and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Our committee commenced hearings in April, and in August we reported out a bill to the House. The House passed that bill on August 16. We had approximately 40 witnesses who appeared before our committee. We had past and present Joint Chiefs of Staff members, CINC's, former secretaries of Defense, and high level civilians. It was really a parade of history. Of course, General Jones and General Taylor had some interesting comments and will undoubtedly make them today.

And all the testimony—not all, but for the most part, the weight of the testimony—did indicate, that the advice was not crisp and that if there were a war, if there were an emergency that arose, that reorganization would be imperative, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not function under its present structure.

And, that is what led the committee to move forward in a manner which is regarded as more subtle than apparent to adopt for the most part General Jones' suggestions, but the committee did not go quite as far as General Jones has suggested. We think that what is contained in the bill is highly important and will lead to great efficiencies and far more effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The most sweeping change that we suggested in the bill was to create a Deputy Chairman. The Deputy Chairman would be a different service than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so that we would not have a service with that extra weight. That Deputy Chairman would not act, except in the absence or the inability of the Chairman to act. He would have four stars and be the same rank, but he would vote in the absence of the Chairman.

In other words, we found that frequently, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to absent themselves from the Washington scene or from these meetings. By having a Deputy Chairman, he would have a certain continuity. He would be able to be present and have continuity of the information and give far more useful input into the final decision mechanism that would then be passed on to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

We felt that the most important factor in the bill itself was to create that Deputy Chairman. There was some question about creating a Deputy Chairman, but I think, overall the services understood and generally accept the Deputy Chairman.

There is still a question as to whether or not you need a Deputy Chairman, but in the opinion of the committee—in order to have this continuity and to have the quality of decision making right straight through, always on tap for immediate response to request for opinions—it is important to have that Deputy Chairman.

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also felt some inabilities or frustrations perhaps in not being able, by law, to render his own opinion. He was, in a sense, in a reporting position to report to the President and to the Secretary of Defense the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What we did in the bill was to say that the Chairman could speak in his own right, as well as report the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. So that if he were asked—or he could volunteer—his opinion as to various needs of this Nation in whatever emergency developed, without challenge on the part of the various members themselves.

In order to be able to help formulate those opinions, we went further and said OK, you will have the opportunity to use some of the Staff in helping to formulate those opinions. Before he was principally a manager of the Staff itself and there was nothing in the law that said that he could utilize any of the JCS staff in helping make his own opinions.

I realize that as a matter of fact and reality, many Chairmen felt that they could go ahead and voice their opinions. They had all kinds of opportunities as their role in the National Security Council and as close advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. But if challenged, the Chairman would not have the mandate, the ability or the power under the law.

Furthermore, we found in our testimony that too often there was a tendency for unanimity, and that tended—even though the individuals that made the input were of high caliber—to cause the testimony, or rather, opinion, to be presented to the Secretary of Defense and the President to be of the lowest common denominator.

That is to say that by sifting down opinions, you really did not get perhaps some intellectual breakthrough that you might have had if one individual saw something that the others did not.

And so we said in the bill that we insist that the dissenting opinion be brought forward by the individual himself, by the individual member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or through the auspices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But it must be presented for consideration by the Secretary of Defense and by the President. This way, a more rounded and more valuable opinion would be presented to the President and to the Secretary of Defense.

The staff, we found, had some real problems in it. In some services, the services were inclined to try to give their very best people's service to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's staff, but we found that in other services, it was regarded by the officer corps that service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a sort of a way station, an inhibition in the progress of their career. So therefore, people really were not seeking service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And indeed, we found that often, the services were not putting their best people on the staff.

So what we said is of those 400 people that serve on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we want your most qualified people, your best people. And furthermore, that service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be and can be an enhancement in the promotion of an individual. We strengthened the hand of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that sense.

We said that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be able to evaluate and have a part in the promotion of all upper grade officers throughout all the services; not just a single service. That gives him a tremendous power and will insure quality and eliminate a great deal of cronyism and other factors we know are in the organization which do not gravitate toward the best defense system of our Nation.

We also found that frequently, the officers going onto the Joint Chiefs of Staff staff would serve only 2 years when they had a 3-year term, as mandated by law. Under the law, only 30 of those could be repeaters. So consequently, the individual would perhaps be educated, trained in staff service for the first year or two, and about the time he is really qualified and really making productive input, he would be assigned to another service.

So we said that 100 of those can be reappointed to service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff staff itself. Of course, in emergency times and wartimes, the 3-year period does not necessarily apply, and a person could have greater continuity during the duration of that particular emergency.

I think generally, Mr. Chairman, that pretty well summarizes the basic factors as to the staff and as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff itself. But we did one more thing in the committee.

We created the Senior Stategy Advisory Board. There is an element of that in the suggestion of General Meyer, and this is an attempt to try to get further input from our best brains, our trained brains, not only from those who served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also, who were Commanders in Chief in the field.

So we say that there will be a board composed of those who served in the field and those who were former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assess strategic planning. This board would take into account all of the elements that go into strategic needs in this Nation, whether it be demographic, resources, use of manpower, use of our military assets, and so on.

This board could meet at the call of the President to help advise and formulate this type of strategy. This was by way of amendment in the committee, and we think it has great advantage in rounding out a mission in that these men can give the advantage of tremendous background experience.

Mr. Chairman, that covers the essence of the testimony we had and the essence of our recommendations. I am sure I overlooked one or two issues, but they would be contained in the bill.

I might say that in the last portion of the bill, we gave a mandate for the operation of the Staff itself. They have never had this mandate before, it has never been defined. We took it straight out of a charter of the National Council, and we said this staff shall work for the unified effort of the services. In other words, for the purpose of defense, for the best interest of the whole United States working together, not as an individual, but each service working in a unified manner.

That is the mandate they have to operate under, and I think this is a strong, important guideline for the Staff to work toward.

[The prepared statement of Representative Richard C. White follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD C. WHITE, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman, I appear in support of H.R. 6954, the proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982, reported by the House Committee on Armed Services on August 11, 1982, and passed by the House of Representatives on August 16, 1982.

On February 3, 1982, Gen. David C. Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee that he was concerned about basic shortcomings in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He further stated that he intended to submit proposals to correct those shortcomings and would work to achieve their acceptance throughout the remaining months of his tenure and thereafter. Though the joint military structure has received much criticism over the years, it was nevertheless unprecedented for an incumbent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fault the organization in such explicit terms and to announce a determined reform effort. Almost as extraordinary was the subsequent action of Gen. Edward C. Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, who joined General Jones in criticizing the present structure and suggested that the chairman had not gone far enough in his recommendations for change.

Prompted by the alarms sounded by Generals Jones and Meyer the Investigations Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee began hearings on Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization in April 1982. The subcommittee received testimony from an impressive body of more than 40 witnesses, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretaries of Defense, former Chairmen and members of the JCS, commanders of unified commands, and other civilian and military witnesses.

The unsettling message revealed by the testimony is that organizational flaws mar the performance of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, our highest military body might fail to function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case during World War II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War, the United States would be faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to our military organization in the midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize that there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict. Equally important in a continually threatening peacetime environment, timely, clearcut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian deliberations has diminished over time and, because decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by cvilian analysts.

Those and many other significant criticisms of the joint military structure were voiced persuasively by the impressive group of witnesses who shared their views with the Congress during the JCS reorganization hearings. The subcommittee found near unanimous agreement that organizational problems hamper the performance of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the subcommittee also learned that views diverge on what, if anything, should be done to correct the existing deficiencies.

My statement will first outline the organizational problems of the existing military structure and explain the proposed House Armed Serivces Committee approach to correcting those deficiencies through legislation, H.R. 6954, and a program of more intense legislative oversight. The statement will then provide a summary of the provisions of H.R. 6954. Next, it will explain the provisions of the bill. Finally, it will discuss the reasons for adopting the bill as soon as possible.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." The advice rendered by the JCS as a corporate body at present is often inadequate. The joint military system is slow to develop formal military positions. As a result, JCS advice often is not available when needed. When formal advice is finally rendered, its form and substance has been so diluted by the joint staffing process, which in effect gives each service a veto on every word, that it is of little use to civilian leaders. According to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "When it comes to the formal product, the papers that come up through the Joint Staff that are approved by the action officers, the planners, the various desks, and the chiefs themselves, and to which they put their signatures, are almost without exception either not very useful or the reverse of being helpful. That is, worse than nothing. I think that is the difference between the people and the system."

The advice rendered by the JCS is also faulted for a lack of realism and the absence of strategic content. The structure of the Joint Chiefs is such that the group often cannot deal realistically with issues which affect service interests. Those issues include matters of fundamental importance to national security: the allocation of resources to various defense missions; the Unified Command Plan which assigns the geographical and functional responsibilities of field commanders; roles and missions of the services; and joint doctrine and training. Concerning strategic thought, witnesses suggested that the multitude of disparate responsibilities shouldered by the chiefs leaves litle time or inclination for reflective strategic analysis.

Witnesses uniformly distinguished between the performance of individual service chiefs, whose personal advice was given high marks, and the performance of the JCS as a group of advisers acting collegially. Thus, the hearings clearly indicated that JCS problems are organizational in nature and by no means reflect on the competence of the members. Among the most significant of the organizational problems which the Committee proposes that Congress do something about through legislation are the following:

The Contradiction Between the Responsibilities of an Individual as a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Chief of his Service.—As a JCS member, a Chief is called upon to transcend service interest and participate in developing advice from a joint, unified militray perspective—a "national" viewpoint. Yet, as a chief of service, the same individual is looked upon as its principal advocate. General Jones emphasized that "if a chief departed a great deal, and consistently, from what came up through the system—from his service—he would be in danger, as has happened in the past, of losing the support of his service."

Also contradictory is the time demanded by the dual responsibilities of the chiefs. Gen. Omar Bradley once indicated that he did not have time to do both jobs well. And General Meyer emphasized this point forcefully during the hearings.

The Limitations of the Joint Staff.—The quality of Joint Staff work is adversely affected by a number of restrictions. Some of these constraints are contained in present legislation; others result from the overwhelming influence exerted by service interests on the joint military organization. In combination, the restrictions have a number of adverse results: a lack of Joint Staff continuity because assignments are legally limited to three years; no guarantee that the most outstanding officers will be assigned to this most important and complex of U.S. military staffs; and crippling procedural constraints that give inordinate influence to service staffs, thereby preventing the Joint Staff from authorizing its own work.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE APPROACH IN H.R. 6954

Though the hearings revealed a number of other significant problems, the Armed Services Committee chose to focus in H.R. 6954 on those which contribute to the most serious JCS shortcoming: inadequate military advice. The legislative measures required to remove restrictions and make the joint military organization more independent are relatively clear-cut, modest, and noncontroversial. Moreover, they may possibly be sufficient in themselves. The Secrtary of Defense possesses significant authority to initiate internal reorganization without resort to Congress.

The final reason for a modest approach is the reservations expressed by some witnesses who, despite generally acknowledging that problems exist, oppose organizational change. The bill is designed to address many of the major areas of concern voiced by advocates of reorganization while accommodating, through specific legislative provisions, the reservations of opponents. H.R. 6954 does this, however, without in any way diminishing its overall purpose of improving the quality of military advice for civilian leaders and thereby restoring the military voice to its appropriate stature in the highest councils of government.

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS IN THE BILL

I. Military advice

A. *JCS Chairman Responsible for Providing Formal Military Advice.*—The Chairman of the JCS would become responsible for providing military advice in its own right as well as acting as the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reporting to the Secretary of Defense and President those issues on which the JCS have agreed and have not agreed.

B. *Provision for Dissenting Views.*—Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who disagrees with military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be authorized to submit his views to the Secretary of Defense and, subsequently, to the President.

C. *Military Advisory Board.*—A Senior Strategy Advisory Board composed of retired former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of unified and specified commands would provide advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy and tactics.

D. *Deputy JCS Chairman.*—To assist the JCS Chairman in carrying out his responsibilities, a Deputy Chairman would be created who would act as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman and exercise such duties as may be delegated by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Chairman would be permitted to attend JCS meetings but would participate as a full member only when acting for the Chairman in the latter's absence or disability.

II. Joint staff

A. *Personnel.*—Joint Staff officers would be selected solely by the JCS Chairman from among the most outstanding service officers. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman, would be responsible for insuring that personnel policies of the armed forces concerning promotion, retention, and assignment of officers give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff. The JCS Chairman would be required to submit to the President an evaluation of the performance of an officer who had served on the Joint Staff when he was recommended for promotion above major general or rear admiral.

B. *Continuity.*—Length of assignment to the Joint Staff, presently limited to three years, could be extended at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense up to three additional years. The limit on the number of officers serving on the Joint Staff who had been recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than three years would be increased from 30 to 100.

C. *Supervision, Management, and Procedures.*—The Joint Staff would become responsible for supporting the JCS Chairman as well as the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman's responsibility for managing the Joint Staff would continue as in present law. His management, however, must take cognizance of the Joint Staff charter (below) and would include providing support for himself as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, chiefs of service and unified and specified commanders would have an opportunity to provide formal comments on Joint Staff reports or recommendations prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

D. *Independence and charter.*—The Secretary of Defense would be responsible for ensuring that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman in meeting the Congressional purposes expressed in the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS IN THE BILL

Expanding and strengthening the sources which render military advice

Although the House Armed Services Committee agrees that the dual responsibilities of service chiefs may undermine the advisory capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate group with respect to certain issues, it is not prepared to admit that the JCS is fatally flawed. For one thing, a range of important issues do not involve service conflicts. Little criticism of JCS performance in those areas was heard during the hearings. Another consideration stems from review of the types of issues on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff allegedly stumbles. Decisions concerning such issues as resource allocation, roles and missions, and doctrine would cause intense internal conflicts within the Department of Defense whether it were organized into services, as at present, or in some other way. Those conflicts have their counterparts in most other large organizations, both public and private. Eliminating the Joint Chiefs of Staff or installing a single military individual in its stead, to whom the JCS would provide advice, would by no means eliminate the conflicting issues which must be resolved. Such measures would merely lessen the potential influence of individuals representing the collective knowledge and experience of the organizations most qualified to judge land, sea, and air warfare issues. Consequently the Committee proposes to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice, retaining the JCS as the principal military advisers.

H.R. 6954 would accomplish the Committee purpose by establishing a Senior Strategy Advisory Board, strengthening the JCS Chairman's role as a military adviser, and creating a Deputy Chairman to assist the Chairman in his added responsibilities.

Senior Strategy Advisory Board.—The board will fill the void in reflective thinking on military matters emphasized by several witnesses, particularly with respect to long-range strategy. It will consist of ten retired generals or admirals who, while on active duty, served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as a commander of a unified or specified command. The Board will provide such advice and recommendations on military strategy and tactics as it considers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be provided appropriate staff support by the Department of Defense, access to all necessary documents, and the requisite call on information from throughout the Department.

JCS Chairman's Advisory Role.—The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsibilities as an adviser championing the unified military viewpoint. He is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no service responsibilities. Though Chairmen continue to wear the uniform of their services, experience has shown that they have traditionally assumed a joint or unified perspective in evaluating military issues, unbiased by former service ties.

H.R. 6954 makes the Chairman responsible for providing military advice in his own right and gives him access to the Joint Staff for assistance in developing his formal positions. Though his advisory responsibility is not confined by the bill to any one area, the Committee intends that the Chairman give special attention to those issues which the collegial JCS has been unable to address effectively—for example, resource allocation, roles and missions, the United Command Plan, and joint doctrine and training. The Committee also intends for the Chairman to forge stronger links with the unified commanders in developing his positions. He should serve as their spokesman in Washington, establishing priorities and integrating their recommendations, into a coherent set of combatant command proposals.

Strengthening the Chairman's advisory role should provide an opportunity for Defense Department action which would relieve the present burden of the service chiefs by diminishing the issues they address as members of the JCS and making its less difficult for them to arrive at joint positions articulated by the Chairman. Evolution along these lines is not meant to stifle legitimate dissent, however. To ensure open channels for expressing opposing views, H.R. 6954 provides that a chief may submit any opinion in disagreement with the military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and subsequently, to the President.

Deputy Chairman of the JCS.—Although the argument for creating a Deputy Chairman is strengthened by the provisions which increase the Chairman's responsibilities, establishing the position makes sense in any case. The JCS Chairman is the senior military officer in the United States. His responsibilities are in proportion to his rank. Yet, unlike the Secretary of Defense, secretaries of the military departments, or chiefs of each service, the Chairman has no deputy. As a consequence, when he is absent the acting chairmanship is often passed among the other chiefs. Testimony revealed that it was not uncommon for the Acting Chairman to change numerous times within a few days during the Chairman's absence. Adm. Carl Thor Hanson, a former Director of the Joint Staff, testified: "During one week of my Director's tour, we had, as I recall, seven changes of the Acting Chairman. There was a fairly active crisis at the time and each rotation involved an updated briefing book for the new Acting Chairman and the resultant quickly and possibly inadequately absorbed knowledge.

"On more than a few occasions during my tour as Secretary Brown's Military Assistant, I recall his frustration with having to take a quickly and inadequately briefed Acting Chairman to an NSC, SCC, or PRC meeting when then-Chairman Gen. George Brown was out of town. Although theoretically any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be completely conversant with all national security issues, practically the responsibilities of being a Service Chief simply preclude complete familiarity with the complex national security issues faced by the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense daily."

H.R. 6954 would correct this situation and provide added support and continuity in the performance of the Chairman's responsibilities.

Improving staff support

Personnel.—Testimony revealed a number of disincentives which at times have had the effect of discouraging officers from seeking Joint Staff assignments. Promotions of Joint Staff members have lagged. Services disagree on the caliber of the officers who should be assigned. Joint Staff influence is perceived as limited; as a result, officers who seek challenge may avoid Joint Staff service.

The House Armed Services Committee considers the Joint Staff the preeminent U.S. miiltary staff. The personnel provisions of H.R. 6954 are designed to ensure that the committee's conviction concerning the Joint Staff becomes manifest in the structure of the Department of Defense. The bill clearly requires assignment of the most outstanding service officers to the Joint Staff. To ensure that result, the bill provides that selection of Joint Staff assignees shall be made solely by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from service lists containing only officers considered to be among the most outstanding.

The bill also includes two provisions concerning promotions. First, it requires the JCS chairman to submit an evaluation to the President of the performance of any officer who has worked on the Joint Staff and who is recommended for promotion to a grade above major general or rear admiral. Second, the bill makes the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the chairman, responsible for ensuring that Joint Staff officers receive equitable career rewards for their performance. Because the demands and complexity of Joint Staff work require talented and dedicated officers, the committee is convinced that performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards. Though no individual should be guaranteed advancement as a result of Joint Staff service, statistical analyses of serving and former Joint Staff officers should be developed and monitored to ensure that Joint Staff performance is given appropriate consideration.

Continuity and Experience.—Existing legislative provisions limiting Joint Staff assignments to three years and prohibiting reassignment in less than three years (except for 30 officers) erect insuperable obstacles to staff continuity. At present, the average Joint Staff assignment is less than 30 months; that means the entire staff turns over every two and one-half years and the average experience level of Joint Staff officers is less than 15 months.

The legislative faults are compounded by poor Department of Defense management. General Jones indicated that only two percent of the Joint Staff officers have previous Joint Staff experience. Moreover, he reported that only 13 percent of middle grade Joint Staff officers, and less than 25 percent of the colonels and Navy captians, have joint schooling.

General Jones remarked to Congressmen: "It is just as though every time you went through an election and came to Washington, you had a whole new staff and only two percent of them ever had any experience in the Congress."

H.R. 6954 relaxes the legislative restrictions on Joint Staff assignments. It provides that the Secretary of Defense may extend the three-year assignment for as much as an additional three years. Also, as many as 100 Joint Staff members, as opposed to 30 at present, could return to Joint Staff duty in less than three years. These less restrictive provisions should afford the flexibility needed to overcome the deficiencies in Joint Staff continuity. At the same time, retaining legislative constraints on the tenure of Joint Staff assignments continues safeguards against the possibility, however remote, that the Joint Staff could evolve into a powerful, self-sustaining, elite military organization superimposed between civilian authorities and the services and combatant commands.

The bill does not address the problems of Joint Staff inexperience caused by faulty Department of Defense personnel management procedures and inattention to joint education. Several witnesses discussed these problems during the hearings. Based on their thoughtful comments, the Committee is convinced of the seriousness of those problems and the necessity for corrective measures. But legislative relief is not required. Consequently, the Committee intends to monitor Defense Department actions to resolve the problems relating to Joint Staff experience identified in the hearings.

Management, Procedures, and Charter.—At present the Joint Staff is smothered by complex, voluminous operating procedures which ensure that the services control the form and content of Joint Staff work. Although the Chairman manages the Joint Staff, by law, he does so on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. And the Chiefs, over time, have developed an ironclad system which protects service interests and, as a corollary, tends to convert the Joint Staff into an executive secretariat dependent on service staffs.

The following description of the joint staffing process graphically illustrates the debilitating effects of the present system. It is excerpted from an answer for the record received from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"General JONES. A typical joint staffing action can be illustrated by outlining how a request from the Secretary of Defense for JCS views on an important defense issue would be handled.

"The Joint Staff action officer is under institutional pressure to find a position with which each of the Services can agree. . . . Likewise, the Service action officers are under institutional pressure to insure that Service roles and missions are not abridged, that major Service weapons systems are emphasized, and that a proposed strategy does not imply more than a fair share of emphasis for another Service.

"The Joint Staff action officer must prepare the initial draft of the response—called the Flimsy. In doing so, he or she is bound to consider the views of the Service action officers and the appropriate CINCs. . . . Each Service representative might write a portion of the paper, a portion of the paper might be provided by a CINC or his staff, or the Joint Staff A/O might assume the entire task. Generally, because the Service staffs are larger and have Service-unique data and analysis not available to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer is very dependent on Service Staff inputs.

"Once the Flimsy is prepared, the Joint and Service action officers meet to discuss its content. . . . For a substantive paper of some length, each Service action officer may have as many as 100 recommended changes. They quickly learn the art of compromise—each agreeing to support the balance of the changes proposed by the other in return for equal support. The Joint Staff action officer then publishes a Buff paper—reflecting the consensus of the meeting. . . .

"Each of the action officers who worked on the Flimsy takes the Buff paper to his Service or Joint Staff planner (0–6). . . . There may be as many as 20 issues left to be resolved. The Planners generally are able to resolve all but two or three of them. The Joint Staff Planner then . . . publishes a final draft on Green paper. . . .

"The Service A/O and Planner present the Green to their Service Operations Deputy (on some occasions an additional review layer—the Deputy Operations Deputy—is added). . . .

"The Operations Deputies represent the first level of review at which a truly joint perspective is brought to bear on the issue. However, the Operations Deputies are dual-hatted, as are the Chiefs, and they are under great institutional pressure to represent Service as well as national interests. . . .

". . . Significant compromise may occur at this level of review. Yet to be resolved issues and divergent views, if any, are highlighted, and the Green is placed on the agenda for the Chiefs to consider.

"The Chiefs then consider the Green, make adjustments as necessary, and send the paper to the SECDEF. . . .

"In sum, the current Joint Staff process encourages compromise, relies too heavily on Service participation, and depends on staff officers who are well versed in Service interests but are ill prepared to address issues from a joint perspective."

The House Armed Services Committee intends that Joint Staff procedures be revised to ensure its independence and focus its efforts toward achieving joint military objectives. H.R. 6954 provides that the JCS Chairman shall manage the Joint Staff in the performance of its duties. Moreover, it directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated. Finally, it provides a charter for the Joint Staff which prescribes the objective of its duties: to support the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in meeting the purposes set forth by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. These provisions provide unmistakable authority for the Chairman to revise the current joint staffing procedures and a corresponding responsibility to do so in shaping the Joint Staff to fulfill its charter. In addition, the provisions vest ultimate responsibility in the Secretary of Defense who is charged with ensuring Joint Staff independence and that the charter be followed.

H.R. 6954 also modifies the terms of reference for managing the Joint Staff. It removes the condition that the Chairman's management shall be "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Thus the Chairman's authority is independent of the JCS. But his management must conform to the Joint Staff charter and would be subject to challenge by the JCS if that body deems Joint Staff support inadequate to its needs. Finally, the provisions would also give the Chairman latitude to elicit Joint Staff support in the performance of his duties as a military adviser in his own right.

An additional provision ensures that the Joint Staff will continue to receive information from the services and the combatant commands with respect to reports and recommendations prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As previously emphasized, the House Armed Services Committee intends H.R. 6954 to establish conditions in which the Joint Staff is the independent author of its own work. But the Committee does not intend to diminish the vital channels of communication between the Joint Staff, services, and combatant commands which are necessary to provide the basic information necessary for competent staff work. To maintain continued intimate interaction among the various military elements as well as ensure that channels for dissent remain open, H.R. 6954 provides that, subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, each officer serving as a chief of service or as the commander of a unified or specified command may have an opportunity to provide formal comments on any report or recommendation of the Joint Staff prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the report or recommendation is submitted.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I strongly recommend adoption of H.R. 6954 for two reasons. First, though this is a modest proposal, each of the provisions of this bill are steps in the right direction—and, collectively, they may possibly prove to be sufficient in themselves with respect to necessary changes in the law. I would much rather err on the side of caution than to strike out into the uncharted waters of fundamental organizational change. If joint military performance does not improve sufficiently, the Congress can always build on the measures contained in this bill.

The second reason for adopting H.R. 6954 follows from the first. Modest, prudent legislation by Congress at this time should encourage action by the Department of Defense to correct the many problems identified in the hearings which should not require legislaiton. The Pentagon is the real arena for reform. This bill, and subsquent formal oversight into its implementation by the Congress, should serve as a catalyst for change in the Defense Department.

Finally, in closing, I want to pay tribute to Gen. David C. Jones. His courage, conviction, and devotion to duty caused him to raise the issue of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform even though he realized that many of his colleagues would not appricate his stand. He deserves credit for placing a significant defense problem on the national agenda for resolution. And Gen. Edward C. Meyer is equally deserving for the part he has played.

I hope the Congress will seize the opportunity presented by the initiatives of these officers to effect needed changes in the joint military structure.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Congressman White, for your very fine testimony. I suppose there is always a certain amount of difficulty in taking men from four different services and putting purple suits on all of them, and there are some things perhaps we can never overcome. But I think we should make the effort.

You described H.R. 6954 as a modest proposal which takes steps in the right direction. Do you favor any changes beyond those that are set forth in H.R. 6954?

Representative WHITE. The tone, the foundation of the suggestions I feel should be made are in the bill. Perhaps we did not go necessarily as strong as many people wold like to see, but in my opinion if we had done that, we might have done damage to the existing structure; and second, we would have perhaps gotten tremendous opposition to the bill.

As it stands now, even those who opposed the bill at its inception because they felt that their own particular service would be denigrated or that there would be diminished stature, have said that they could live with it.

Chairman TOWER. Could you expand on the advantage that you believe the position of Deputy Chairman, which is created by this bill, would have over the present rotating system where the acting chairmanship is rotated among the heads of the service?

Representative WHITE. Mr. Chairman, we looked at that issue. For instance, on one particular day, there were four different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had so many factors going on, so many engagements that they had to attend, it is like the Representatives and the Senators, you know how our time is pulled in every direction, yet we have a basic responsibility and it is tough to meet every obligation.

But at least if you had a Deputy Chairman, he has one obligation, and that is the chairmanship in the absence of the Chairman. Rather than shift it around from Chairman to Chairman to Chairman, I feel that continuity is highly important.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Congressman. I apologize for the paucity of attendance here today. There is a great deal going on here in the last-minute rush to complete our business in the lame-duck session, and most of our Members are detained on other matters.

I am going to call on the panel now. Congressman, we would be delighted to have you stay for as long as you wish.

Representative WHITE. If the Chairman will excuse me, we are trying to get some bills over to you to increase your agony, I am afraid.

Chairman TOWER. It will be agonizing, I can assure you.

Thank you very much, Congressman.

I would now like to call on General Jones, General Taylor, and Admiral Holloway. With three such distinguished gentlemen here, I am not sure what protocol dictates, but I would just arbitrarily establish the order as follows: First, we will hear from General Jones, then from General Taylor and then from Admiral Holloway. As an old naval person, I always like to give the Navy the last word.

General Jones, we are delighted to see you back here under, perhaps, less trying circumstances than when you have appeared before. We are very much interested in the proposals that you have made, the suggestions you have made, and, of course, any comment that you might have on the legislation that has already passed the House, H.R. 6954.

General Jones has served with great distinction. He is an old friend of this committee, we are delighted to have him back. General Jones?

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF, RETIRED

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to come back and testify on what I consider to be the most important defense issue facing the Congress and the Nation. It makes issues on the MX and others pale in comparison with how do we do our defense business. And I commend Congressman White and his committee for having taken many days and something like 40 witnesses to address the isssue.

You recall in February, I came out with my article that proposed some changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At that time, I had deep concerns about the broader issue of defense organization, but I thought as a serving officer it would be appropriate that I limit myself to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Then last month I came out with an article that has been distributed, called "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment?" (see p. 16). I do not think one can address the issue of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without looking at the bigger issue of what is wrong in defense and what are the problems, not only in the Pentagon, but here in Congress, in dealing with these important defense issues.

So in my very brief statement I would like to address the broader problems of defense so that we can fit the Joint Chiefs of Staff problems into that context.

First, as I outline in my article, there is very little disciplined long-term planning in defense. There is a lack of cohesiveness; the strategy is so all-encompassing that it means all things to all men, and therefore, we truly do not have a strategy because the strategy tries to do more than the resources provided.

Authority and responsibility are very badly diffused. We have many committees, a lot of people can say no, a lot of people can delay things; few people can say yes. Our commanders in the field who would be responsible for fighting have little authority, they have little say over people, over dollar expenditures.

In the programs and budgets, there is very little serious examination of alternatives. Most of the advice is vertical, coming either from the services or from staff agencies in the Secretary of Defense's office, and there is very little of what I would call the horizontal, the integrated effort, the joint effort, a unified effort.

Coherent requirements are not developed. To a great extent, it is a hodgepodge of inputs, and then very little integration of that effort. And in the budget, there is very little discipline. I believe you know and I know that $1.6 trillion will not pay for what we have started. Programs cost more than projected.

Norm Augustine in an excellent book called "Augustine's Laws," points out that in 90 percent of our programs over 30 years, they have cost more than had been budgeted, even after inflation was excluded. The increases were about one and a half times on the average.

So what will happen? The programs that we have underway will cost far more than planned in the budget, and, therefore, other things will have to be dropped out, programs will have to be stretched. When you stretch programs, that increases costs, and we end up with a catch-22 situation.

Recently, it is claimed that there were efficiencies in defense because a number of secondary programs were canceled. Primary programs very seldom are canceled. But dozens of secondary programs were, and that billions of dollars were saved. I say true savings will come when we end up not starting programs that we cannot bring to fruition. And other programs that we do start, bring them in reasonably on time and reasonably within the cost estimates. So there is very little discipline in the business.

Responsibility lies primarily within the Defense Department: The problems are systemic rather than with individuals. The Congress must share some of this responsibility. All tend to look at the wrong end of the telescope and concentrate on individual programs and not on the strategy, on the long-range planning, the concepts.

That is why I commend you for having this hearing, because I think this looks at the right end of the telescope, looks at the bigger picture of how we do business. You are well familiar with the intramural scramble for resources, both in the Pentagon and here in the Congress with multiple committees of the Congress addressing the issues.

I think it is appropriate for other committees to be involved in fixing budget levels, but to me, the Armed Services Committee ought to be the committee that takes the lead in determining what we have and what we obtain in defense. And this is certainly not true to a great extent today.

We end up as a result of this conflict not getting a budget. It is very inefficient to have December be with us, and we do not have a budget. We do not know when we are going to have a budget. We may have a continuing resolution that will let us continue to operate but not operate in a highly efficient manner. So there is a lot that needs to be done.

Chairman TOWER. Amen. I agree with you.

General JONES. There are some tough decisions that have to be made both in the executive branch and in the Congress in how we do business.

Accountability of what is done is woefully inadequate. We have so many people in on the discussions to start with, and then there is a tremendous turmoil, and we have had 15 Secretaries of Defense since 1947, and now we will have our 20th Deputy Secretary of Defense since that job was established in 1949.

Every 2 years, 2 to 3 years, you get another group testifying. We end up on the average with three program managers in the life of a program. There is about a 28- to 30-month turnover both in civilians and in most of the senior military people. And many of the rules, regulations, and laws tend to promote that great instability.

I do not intend to go into any details of my recommendations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will be glad to respond to any questions.

Chairman TOWER. Anything you want to submit for the record will be included in its entirety.

General JONES. All right, sir.

But what I do say is, No. 1, the broader issues have to be addressed. No. 2, I advocate strengthening the role of the Secretary of Defense, and that he needs better advice on alternatives. Today he gets one set of advice with little advice on alternatives. I would rely on a more macroorganized joint system. As long as four out of five of the members of the Joint Chiefs are service chiefs, and all the promotions and the moneys go through the service, you are going to end up with the services dominating the joint system. You will have what I call an input from the joint system that is an echo plus, meaning an echo of supporting what the services do, but the services are not given money.

So I submit that there are major changes that have to be made. The British faced up to this decision earlier this year. They had a system that was similar to ours. They changed, and they are very pleased with how it worked in the Falklands crisis.

We have two choices. We have a choice of recognizing that we have serious problems in defense, and doing something about it. If we don't address these problems, we will not meet the threat and will continue to waste billions of dollars of money that this country cannot afford to waste. And tragically, we might end up with a crisis or a disaster and then fall back and regroup and try to solve some of those problems. We have done that in the past with Pearl Harbor and other times in defense. It might be too late. I recommend the committee address this problem in great depth and in a broad context of our overall defense to include the role of Congress. It should be done in an atmosphere next year that is not quite as hectic as this crisis of the lame-duck session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, General Jones.

[The article "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment," submitted by Gen. David C. Jones, follows:]

WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

(The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticizes the Nation's military leadership as a group of rigid and conflicting bureaucracies unresponsive to changing conditions. He proposes a no-nonsense plan to make the defense system a more flexible, unified and forward-looking instrument of national policy.)

(By David C. Jones)

At a late-afternoon meeting at the White House a few months ago, President Reagan, who had just returned from horseback riding at Quantico, turned to me in jest, but with a touch of nostalgia, and asked, "Isn't there some way we can bring back the horse cavalry?" My reply was: "Just wait, Mr. President. We are starting by resurrecting battleships."

Below the surface of this lighthearted exchange lie two pervasive problems within defense:

We are too comfortable with the past.

We do not make a sufficiently rigorous examination of defense requirements and alternatives.

By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to change. As the largest organization in the free world, our defense establishment—the Department of Defense—has most of the problems of a large corporation but lacks an easily calculated "bottom line" to force needed change. At the core are the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps: institutions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation of each service rests on imbuing its members with pride in its mission, its doctrine and its customs and discipline—all of which are steeped in traditions. While these deep-seated service distinctions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them engenders tendencies to look inward and to insulate the institutions against outside challenges.

The history of our services includes striking examples of ideas and inventions whose time had come, but which were resisted because they did not fit into existing service concepts. The Navy kept building sailing ships long after the advent of steam power. Machine guns and tanks were developed in the United States, but our Army rejected them until long after they were accepted in Europe. The horse cavalry survived essentially unchanged right up until World War II despite evidence that its utility was greatly diminished decades earlier. Even Army Air Corps officers were required to wear spurs until the late 1930's.

But the armed services are only part of the problem. The Defense Department has evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies—services, agencies, staffs, boards and committees—which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit traditional missions and methods. There is no doubt that the cavalry leaders would have quickly adopted a horse which went farther and faster—a high-technology stallion. The result of this rigidity has been an ever-widening gap between the need to adapt to changing conditions and our ability to do so. Over the last two to three years the American public has become increasingly concerned over our deteriorating position in military power and convinced that we must devote more to our defenses than we did in the 1960's and 1970's. But after serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff longer than anyone else in history and under more Presidents and Secretaries of Defense (four of each), and being a student of military history and organizations, I am convinced that fundamental defense deficiencies cannot be solved with dollars alone—no matter how much they are needed.

We do not think through our defense problems adequately, and we are getting less capability than we should from our increased defense budgets. There is reason to believe that, faced with a contingency requiring a major joint operation, our performance would be below the level we should expect or need.

No one element of our defense establishment is singularly responsible for our defense problems. The problems I will identify, and for which I will propose solutions, have existed too long to be the fault of any particular administration or of particular personalities in or out of uniform.

History books for the most part glorify our military accomplishments, but a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern:

Unpreparedness at the onset of each new crisis or war.

Initial failures.

Reorganizing while fighting.

Building our defenses as we cranked up our industrial base.

Prevailing by wearing down the enemy—by being bigger, not smarter.

We could do things poorly at the start of past wars and still recover because time was on our side.

The North was a striking example of a bureaucratized military establishment during the Civil War. Initially, the South had better leadership, was far more flexible and was able to do a great deal more with its limited resources and forces. The North suffered early defeats and encountered many leadership problems, but finally won by virtue of overwhelming industrial output and military manpower.

We also had serious organizational problems during the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. The interservice wrangling had been so great that the Army commander refused to let the Navy be represented at the formal surrender. Unfortunately, this was not the last case of split responsibilities and interservice conflicts obstructing our conduct of a war.

In the aftermath of the 1898 war, the services, particularly the Army, instituted some organizational reforms. Despite a great deal of opposition, a Chief of Staff of the Army was created in 1903 and a Chief of Naval Operations was established in 1916. But the War Department (the precursor of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force) and the Navy Department continued to be riddled with semiautonomous, often intractable fiefdoms, branches corps, departments, bureaus, and so forth.

World War I was the most tragic example of trying to win a war through mass and attrition. Thousands of young men gave their lives to advance a few yards over the enemy trenches, only to be thrown back the next day at an equal cost to the enemy.

The emergence of the airplane as a major military asset during World War I should have alerted us to the need to adjust our doctrines and our organizations to changing realities. The continued development of air power could not help but blur the traditional distinction between land and naval warfare, but the Nation reacted to this phenomenon in a traditionally bureaucratic manner: Each service developed its own air power (today there are *four* air-power entities), and protected it with artificial barriers to obscure the costly duplications. One barrier, established in 1938 (later rescinded), prohibited any Army Air Corps airplane from flying more than 100 miles out to sea.

The Army and Navy began World War II with authority and responsibility diffused. Each still had many semiautonomous agencies with little coordination below the chief-of-service level. Soon after Pearl Harbor, Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, streamlined the Army by reducing the number of officers with direct access to him from 61 to 6. The Navy also made some adjustments. (The services have since slipped back into the old patterns. The number of officers having direct access to most service chiefs—especially when the joint system is considered—is again very high.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established early in 1942 as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Although the wartime Chiefs addressed certain priority issues, to a great extent World War II was fought along service lines. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his United States (as distinct from his Allied) role, reported to General Marshall. In the Pacific, the difficulties of integrating the operations of the services resulted in the establishment of two separate theaters: the Southwest Pacific Area, with Gen. Douglas MacArthur reporting to General Marshall, and the Pacific Ocean Area, with Adm. Chester W. Nimitz reporting to Adm. Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations. Split authority and responsibility in the Pacific was a continuing problem, and nearly caused a disaster during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Today the Pacific has been joined into one command and our combat commanders now report directly to the Secretary of Defense rather than to their service chiefs. But the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine components of our combat commands report both to their service chiefs and the combat commanders, and the service chiefs still have the greatest influence over their actions. Furthermore, many of the fundamental problems of the World War II joint system still exist below the surface.

We won World War II despite our organizational handicaps, not because we were smarter, but once again because we and our allies were bigger. We had the time and geographic isolation to mobilize American industry and a superb code-breaking effort to aid our intelligence gathering.

As the war drew to a close, an exhaustive debate ensued on how to organize the postwar military. The Army favored a highly integrated system, but the Navy and others were strongly opposed, some fearing that the Army would dominate any integrated system. The Air Force, then still a part of the Army, supported integration, but was primarily interested in becoming a separate service.

Those opposed to integration were backed by stronger constituencies, including powerful forces in Congress, than were the advocates of unification. Arguments that unification threatened civilian control over the military soon dominated the debate. As it became quite clear to the advocates that major change was unlikely, a little-known and surprising effort was made to salvage true integration: Karl Bendetsen, then a colonel on the War Department General Staff, but later the Under Secretary of the Army, and then chairman of the board of the Champion International Corporation, was the prime mover. He had been designated by General Marshall as the War Department liaison officer for the unification project, dealing with the White House, the Navy and Congress. After several months of analysis, he concluded that, in the absence of a new and bold initiative, unification as conceived by President Harry S Truman, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and General Marshall had no chance of success.

In response to General Marshall's inquiry as to what such an initiative might be, Colonel Bendetsen responded that the only way to overcome the Navy's resistance would be to do away with the War Department, transfer all of its elements to the Navy, and redesignate that organization as the Department of Defense.

Instead of throwing the officer out of his office, General Marshall, one of the most consummate soldier-statesmen in our history, marched him straight to Secretary Stimson to outline the proposal. After an extended discussion among the three, Stimson called President Truman and asked for a meeting on this subject.

President Truman was intrigued by the idea and decided that the liaison officer should try it out on Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. Though his first reaction appeared to be positive, Secretary Forrestal rejected the proposal, on the supposition that a single armed forces chief of staff could become too powerful and threaten civilian control. So after nearly two years of studies, debate and political maneuverings, the National Security Act of 1947 emerged with a compromise military establishment: a loose confederation of large, rigid service bureaucracies—now four rather than three—with a Secretary of Defense powerless against them.

Ironically, Mr. Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense, and, after learning at first hand his impotence in dealing with service autonomy told Karl Bendetsen, by then a civilian, that he, the Secretary, had been wrong in rejecting Mr. Bendetsen's advice.

One of Mr. Forrestal's last acts as Secretary of Defense was to recommend a much more integrated Department of Defense, but changes came slowly. Amendments to the National Security Act in 1949, 1953 and 1958 strengthened the Secretary's authority and expanded the size and purview of his staff, but did little to alter the relative influence of the joint military system and the services.

President Eisenhower had recommended a much stronger joint system in 1953 and 1958, and his wisdom was borne out by our conduct of the Vietnam War—

perhaps our worst example of confused objectives and unclear responsibilities, both in Washington and in the field. Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself. For example, each fought its own air war, agreeing only to limited measures for a coordinated effort. "Body count" and "tons dropped" became the measures of merit. Lack of integration persisted right through the 1975 evacuation of Saigon—when responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea; each of these set a different "H-hour," which caused confusion and delays.

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have acted bravely throughout our history. With few exceptions, our forces have performed well at the unit level. And there have been bright moments at the higher levels also. The landing at Normandy, Patton's charge across France, the battle of Midway and the landing at Inchon were brilliant strategic conceptions, valiantly executed. But these peaks in martial performance followed valleys in which the nation found itself poorly prepared, poorly organized and imperiled by inadequacies in Washington. In the past, we had time to overcome our mistakes. Our allies often bore the initial brunt, and we had the industrial capacity for a quick buildup in the military capacity needed to turn the tide. Today we can expect no such respite. Our allies could not delay the Soviet Union while we prepared, and our industrial base has fallen into a state of disrepair. Nuclear weapons have added new dimensions which make constant readiness even more critical. If we are to deter another conflict, or to succeed if one be thrust upon us, we must be prepared to do things right on the battlefield the first time.

A sound defense posture should begin with sound long-term planning, a means to measure progress, and authoritative direction and control to insure that all elements contribute to a well-defined objective. On the surface, our system appears to provide such an orderly approach. The process starts with a defense guidance document prepared by the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, based on Administration policy and fiscal guidance and on inputs from field commanders, the services, the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense's staff and other relevant sources. The services build their annual programs on the basis of the defense guidance's objectives and budget targets and then submit them to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary convenes a committee to review the documents and recommend changes to bring the service programs into conformance with the nation's priorities. After being submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the budgets are administered by the services and agencies assigned to the Department of Defense.

But this process begins to break down at the very beginning because the military strategy contained in the defense guidance always demands greater force capabilities than the budget constraints will allow. Some administrations have attempted to limit the requirements by calling for the capability to fight "one and a half" or "two and a half" wars, while others have proposed preparing for global war almost without limits. In any case, the guidance almost invariably leads to what the Joint Chiefs have long called the "strategy-force mismatch" as requirements outpace capabilities.

Current guidance is so demanding that developing truly coherent programs to carry it out is impossible even under the most optimistic budget assumptions. The guidance places high priority on the long-term survivability of our strategic forces if a nuclear war should occur. Spending programs now include improvements in strategic command and control, a new bomber force with the B–1 and cruise missiles (and eventually the Stealth bomber), new nuclear submarines with improved missiles, and the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. The guidance also requires a revitalized air defense, an expanded civil-defense program and possibly an antiballistic-missile system to protect the MX. Military developments in space will receive additional priority. At the other end of the nuclear spectrum, ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles are planned for Europe to reinforce our position in arms-control negotiations, or to restore theater nuclear balance if those negotiations break down.

These nuclear requirements are large indeed, but they pale in comparison with conventional force requirements—expenditures for conventional forces are about three times those for nuclear forces. Substantial improvements in European and Pacific operations are planned and the ability to project power, especially in Southwest Asia, is to be expanded. The defense guidance tells the services to improve the readiness of conventional forces, greatly increase strategic-mobility capabilities and build up the Navy to provide maritime superiority. At the same time, they are to replace many weapon systems which are nearing obsolescence. And they are to provide greater sustainability so as to be able to fight a longer war. Improved industrial preparedness is also a goal.

There is simply not enough money in the projected defense budgets to do all this, but the defense guidance does little to set meaningful priorities or mandate a search for new directions to maintain our security. This is not a problem unique to this Administration.

Since requirements exceed resources, the military services invariably allocate resources among their traditional missions, and seek ways to justify a greater share of the budget. But additional funds are likely to come only from another service's share, so each attempts to outgame the others without sufficient regard for cross-service programs.

The vast array of service programs is then submitted to the defense committee. The name and composition of the committee may vary from administration to administration, but its function remains the same. Currently it is called the Defense Resources Board, and its chairman is the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and includes the service Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The service chiefs attend as observers.

Week after week, the board meets in an attempt to examine major issues, but the focus is primarily on the service programs, which include many hundreds of items deemed essential by their advocates. The board fusses over marginal changes in the service programs, but it is literally impossible for it to address them in sufficient depth or to focus on the most critical cross-service issues.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are assigned a role in this process, but each service usually wants the Joint Staff merely to echo its views. Since four of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also service chiefs, a negotiated amalgam of service views almost invariably prevails when inputs are finally proposed by the Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only military member of the Defense Resources Board and can offer independent opinions, but the chairman has only five people working directly for him to sift through the various issues. (The Joint Staff belongs to the Joint Chiefs' corporate body, not to the chairman.) Consequently, chairmen traditionally focus on a few critical items. In my case, they were readiness, command and control, and mobility.

The result of this tedious process is a defense budget that is derived primarily from the disparate desires of the individual services rather than from a well-integrated plan based on a serious examination of alternatives by the civilian and military leadership working together. Inevitably, a Secretary of Defense either supports a total program that is roughly the sum of the service inputs (limited by fiscal guidance) or resorts to forcing changes, knowing that advocates of disapproved programs will continue the opposition into the Congressional hearings.

But resource allocation by the board is only the beginning of the problem. The optimism expressed in program proposals seldom comes true. The chairman of the Defense Science Board, Norman Augustine, has written that over the last 30 years our major weapons systems have met performance goals 70 percent of the time (not bad), but have met schedules only 15 percent of the time, and cost estimates only 10 percent of the time, even after accounting for inflation.

As costs increase, programs are stretched out. Weapons are usually ordered in numbers well below efficient production rates, to the detriment of the "industrial base." This only leads to further cost increases, the cycle repeats itself, and we find ourselves trapped in a Catch-22 situation. Tough decisions are not made, so the financial "bow wave" that always spills ahead is magnified. Attempts to improve efficiency, such as the current Administration's multiyear procurement contracts, are very helpful, but do not get to the fundamental problems of planning and resources.

The lack of discipline in the budget system prevents making the very tough choices of deciding what to do and what not to do. Instead, strong constituencies in the Pentagon, Congress and industry support individual programs, while the need for overall defense effectiveness and efficiency is not adequately addressed.

Pentagon leadership finds it virtually impossible to spend the time necessary to impose discipline on the budget process. Cycles overlap and, as this year, we usually find Congress considering a last-minute multibillion-dollar supplemental appropriation at the end of one fiscal year and unable to agree on the budget before the start of the next fiscal year. At the same time, the Pentagon is struggling with the next five-year defense plan and the subsequent budget submission. This immerses the leadership constantly in confusing external struggles for public and Congressional support and bewildering internal disputes over resources and turf.

The same pressures burden the service leaders as they attempt to cope with managing procurement programs, recruiting and training the forces, and maintaining discipline and esprit. Chiefs are judged by their peers and services on their success in obtaining funding for their own major systems and on protecting service interests in the three afternoons a week they spend in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, a service chief, who is a service advocate in one hat and supposedly an impartial judge of competing requirements in his other hat as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has a fundamental conflict of interest.

To sum up, our defense establishment suffers serious deficiencies, including the following:

Strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men.

Leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected.

Authority and responsibility are badly diffused.

Rigorous examination of requirements and alternatives is not made.

Discipline is lacking in the budget process.

Tough decisions are avoided.

Accountability for decisions or performance is woefully inadequate.

Leadership, often inexperienced, is forced to spend too much time on refereeing an intramural scramble for resources.

A serious conflict of interest faces our senior military leader.

The combat effectiveness of the fighting force—the end product—does not receive enough attention.

Before too much criticism is heaped on the current Administration, let me point out that these problems have been with us for decades and there are no easy solutions.

What all this adds up to is that it is an uphill struggle for anyone—including a Secretary of Defense—to gain real control of our defense establishment. An earlier study on defense organization stated that everyone was responsible for everything and no one was specifically responsible for anything. The top leadership is too often at the mercy of lon-entrenched bureaucracies. It is ironic that the services have, with considerable help from outside constituencies, been able to defeat attempts to bring order out of chaos by arguing that a source of alternative military advice for the President and Secretary of Defense runs the risk of undermining civilian control.

There has for some time been an imbalance in the degree of control that our civilian leadership exercises over operational and other defense matters. In operational matters, it is pervasive. An order cannot go out of Washington to move a ship or other combat unit or to take any other specific operational action without the specific approval and initialing of the directive by the Secretary of Defense. At times, Defense Secretaries and their staffs have been involved in the most minute details of operations.

In other areas, civilian influence is more often apparent than real. Defense Secretaries are given very little comprehensive advice on alternative strategies or systems. In an attempt to fill the void, Defense Secretaries have often turned to civilian analysts for such advice. Such consultants can provide a useful service, but they cannot make up for the absence of alternative advice from experienced, serving military officers. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee beholden to the interests of the services, has not been able to provide such advice during its existence is amply documented in scores of studies over many years.

Civilian accountability within the Defense Department is undermined further by the rapid turnover or by inexperience in the senior leadership. In the 35 years since the department was founded, there have been 15 Secretaries of Defense, and there have been 19 Deputy Secretaries of Defense in the 33 years since the establishment of that position. A recent study revealed that the civilian policy makers in the Defense Department stay on the job an average of only 28 months.

Little of what I have said is new. Reams of paper have been used since World War II to describe these same deficiencies. President Eisenhower, who knew well both sides of the civilian-military equation, tried to resolve the basic problem, but the effects of his efforts were limited. Others have also tried, but with even less success. The bureaucratic resistance to change is enormous and is reinforced by many allies of the services—in Congress and elsewhere—who are bent on keeping the past enthroned. Civilian defense leaders have been reluctant to push hard for changes, either because they thought they could not succeed or because they did not want to expend the necessary political capital which they believed was better spent on gaining support for the defense budget. Many have feared that raising basic organizational issues might distract attention from the budget and give ammunition to opponents, who would use admissions of organizational inefficiency to argue for further budget cuts. Yet, since the public already believes that all is not right with the Department of Defense, bold reforms would not only increase our defense effectiveness, but would strengthen public support as well.

That the balance of influence within the defense establishment is oriented too much toward the individual services has been a constant theme of many past studies of defense organization. A special study group of retired senior officers just this April found it necessary to report that "a certain amount of service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the services too much and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little."

It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties" which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a "true" has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. What is lacking is a counterbalancing system, involving officers not so beholden to their services, who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, weapons systems, war planning and other contentious issues to offset the influence of the individual services.

President Eisenhower tried to resolve this problem in 1958 by removing the services from the operational chain of command. In essence, two separate lines of authority were created under the Secretary of Defense: an operational line and an administrative line. The operational line runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combat commands—those theater or functional commands headed by the Eisenhowers, the Nimitzes, the MacArthurs of the future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not directly in this line of command but do, through the Joint Staff, provide the Secretary oversight of the combat commands, and pass his orders to them. The administrative line runs to the service departments responsible for recruiting, training, procurement and a myriad of other tasks necessary to develop the forces assigned tothe combat commands.

President Eisenhower intended that the operational side would assist the Secretary of Defense in developing strategy, operational plans and weapons and force-level requirements based on the needs of "truly unified commands." The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff were to be the *Secretary's* military staff in this effort. The services would remain the *providers* of the forces needed by the combatant commands but would not determine *what* to provide or how those forces would be employed. But President Eisenhower did not achieve what he wanted. The scales of influence are still tipped too far in favor of the services and against the combat commanders.

Although the combat commanders now brief the Defense Resources Board and have every opportunity to communicate with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, virtually their only power is that of persuasion. The services control most of the money and the personnel assignments and promotions of their people wherever assigned, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Unified Command Staffs. Officers who perform duty outside their own services generally do less well than those assigned to duty in their service, especially when it comes to promotion to general or admiral. The Chiefs of Staff of the services almost always have had duty on service staffs in Washington but almost never on the Joint Staff. Few incentives exist for an officer assigned to joint duty to do more than punch his or her ticket, and then get back into a service assignment. I cannot stress this point too strongly: He who controls dollars, promotions and assignments controls the organization—and the services so control, especially with regard to personnel actions.

The most recent critique of defense problems was contained in a book published in September called "U.S. Defense Planning," written by John M. Collins of the Library of Congress. This study reveals some new deficiencies as well as pointing out the old ones. "Interests, objectives, policies, commitments, strategic concepts and force postures often fail to complement each other" and "Preoccupation with present problems leaves little time to contemplate those coming down the pike" are but two of many such conclusions.

Yet it is very difficult to break out of the Department of Defense's organizational maze. Many have struggled vainly within the system to make improvements in the balance between the operational and administrative lines. Solutions to some of the basic interservice problems are heralded every few years but to this date have not addressed the fundamental causes. To provide a balance, the services must share some of their authority, but they have proved to be consistently unwilling to do so. A service chief has a constituency which, if convinced that he is not fighting hard enough for what the service sees as its fair share of defense missions and resources, can destroy the chief's effectiveness.

Only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unconstrained by a service constituency, but he is in a particularly difficult position. His influence stems from his ability to persuade all his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on a course of action and any disagreement requires by law a report to the Secretary of Defense. A Chairman jeopardizes his effectiveness if, early in his tour, he creates dissension within the corporate body by trying to force the services to share some of their authority.

By the summer of 1980, after serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for two years, I had become convinced that we could not begin to overcome our defense problems without a basic restructuring of military responsibility. In the early fall, I discussed the problem with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and found that he shared my concerns. Although he was soon to leave office, he has remained a staunch supporter of organizational change. My first conversation with Casper W. Weinberger, just before he assumed the office, was also promising. He indicated a receptiveness to any ideas that would improve defense decision-making and management. Soon thereafter I commissioned the group of retired senior officers mentioned earlier to examine the issues thoroughly and to interview and incorporate the views of the Chiefs, the combat commanders, joint staff personnel and many others.

At the same time, I studied the organizational arrangements in other countries—East and West. The Soviet Union has a highly centralized system with a general staff numbering in the thousands, but it also has many bureaucratic problems common to an authoritarian system. There are quite a few Western democracies with a centralized system that works well. For example, the Norweigians have a chief of defense who has great authority and control over the services and is considered a positive link in maintaining democratic control. At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries that keep their services well apart and in competition with each other. Iran under the Shah and Argentina with its junta made up of the three service heads are examples of such competitive systems. Our system falls more toward the competitive than the centralized end of the spectrum.

In trying to determine where our system should be on this scale, I had long discussions with my British counterpart, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin, Chief of the Defense Staff of the United Kingdom. Our system is an outgrowth of the British World War II system, and Sir Terence and I concluded that our respective organizational arrangements were now outmoded. We saw almost identical problems in our two military systems and came to very similar conclusions as to what was needed. Despite strong opposition from two of the British services, Sir Terence was able to secure quick approval to act on his conclusions from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The major changes—providing a military counterbalance to the separate services—were implemented this spring and contributed to British success in the Falklands dispute.

Early this year, I aired certain proposals publicly in the winter issue of Directors and Boards magazine. Gen. Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, soon published an article containing similar criticisms and recommended even greater changes in military organization.

This past summer, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, under the chairmanship of Representative Richard C. White of Texas, held extensive hearings on the issue. The witnesses in support of major changes outnumbered the opponents by almost three to one. I was particularly impressed that all of the former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense who testified supported at least as much change as I recommended, and most advocated even more.

It is no secret that the greatest opposition to any change came from the Department of the Navy, just as it did in 1947 and has ever since. I believe I understand, even though I cannot agree with the reasons. The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the services—it has its own army, navy and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone.

The Army is and always has been the most supportive of the services in cross-service activities and the strongest advocate of organizational changes which would improve unity of effort. Its reasons, too, are understandable—and I agree with them. The Army is the least strategically independent service. It depends on the Air Force for much firepower and on the Air Force and Navy for mobility; the Army can, in fact, do very little in isolation and hence is particlarly shortchanged by a lack of integration and cooperation among the services.

The Air Force has some missions requiring the cooperation of the other services, and some which it can pursue independently. Not surprisingly, Air Force officers generally have been more ambivalent about change.

Given these circumstances, we cannot expect the services to agree on profound changes no matter how badly needed, for the changes inevitably would result in the services' giving up some of their sovereignty.

The bill drafted and then passed in the House avoided the issues on which the services are most sensitive; the bill contains some good provisions but they are insufficient to correct the basic ills of the system. It is to be hoped that the Senate will hold in-depth hearings, for public airing of the issues is essential in obtaining widespread understanding and support. There is always great reluctance in Washington to take on entrenched bureaucracies in the absence of some consensus for change.

Since I dealt only with military organization in my initial proposals, some misinterpreted them as calling for an all-powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is definitely not my intent. On the contrary, my proposals are designed to provide the Secretary of Defense more balanced military advice and staff support in order to *strengthen* civilian control. I believe we must provide a proper balance between the services and the joint system—the administrative and operational lines of authority and responsibility. So long as the leadership of the operational side remains within the control of the four services, individual service interests—which are oriented to independent capabilities—will continue to dominate the military advice offered to the Secretary of Defense.

In broad outline, this is what I believe must be done:

To eliminate service domination of the channels of military advice to the Secretary and the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—rather than the five-man committee of he Chiefs—should represent the operational side, while the service chiefs should continue to represent the administrative side of our military organization. The Chairman would receive advice from both the service chiefs and the combat commanders in preparing his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, there should be a provision for a direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense or the President, as appropriate, if a service chief disagreed with the Chairman on a *joint* matter and felt strongly about the differences The influence of the combat commanders on operational matters should be increased to equal that of the service chiefs.

To insure that he can meet his responsibility to the Secretary and the President, the Chairman should be authorized a deputy chairman and the Joint Staff should be assigned to the Chairman rather than the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs. The service chiefs and their staff (most of which dwarf the Joint Staff) would still have access to the Joint Staff but would not have a de facto veto of all proposals which subordinated service interests to greater cross-service effectiveness.

Systems analysts should be transferred from the office of the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman's office to insure a good balance of civilian and military perspectives on alternatives offered to the Secretary. As a related action, many of the more than 500 military officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense should be reassigned back to their services as the Joint Staff becomes defensewide oriented rather than service dominated.

Discipline should be imposed on the guidance-program-budget cycle. Not only should there be a requirement for an independent cost analysis on every major program, but greater reliance should be placed on the results. Until the system proves it can plan and execute in a disciplined way, a substantial percentage of dollars in the five-year program should be reserved for unexpected cost growth or contingency operations. This would force some tough decisions at the beginning of the cycle which would avoid wasting money and provide greater effectiveness in the long run by not allowing programs to start that cannot be supported even under the most optimistic budget projections.

Administrative matters should be decentralized to the services, with their leadership, military and civilian, being held more accountable for performance. Fixing responsibility for defensewide advice more clearly on a joint system not dominated by the services would allow the service chiefs and their staffs to spend much more time on running their services.

Substantial changes should be made in military personnel policies so that officers could develop a broader vision than that of their own service and could be prepared better for both service and interservice assignments. We should begin by encouraging and allowing a substantial number of graduates from one service academy to volunteer for transfer to another service immediately upon graduation. The Air Force benefited a great deal in its early days by receiving officers from both West Point and Annapolis—officers with basic understanding of the other services. And two- or three-year assignments of officers to another service should become more common.

The professional education system should be changed to stress the joint needs in defense by providing the National Defense University limited oversight of part of the curriculum of the Service War Colleges.

We should re-examine the retirement system which provides great incentives for officers to serve for 20 years, but very few incentives for the best to stay longer. We still lose too many of our best officers at the peak of their capabilities. The joint system should be given some limited influence in the promotion and assignment of officers so that joint duty could become more attractive and rewarding for the best.

Finally, the Congressional restrictions on tenure of assignment on the Joint Staff should be removed so that we do not continue to experience a 100 percent turnover in a little over two years. Collectively, the above should provide opportunities for greater stability and experience in officer assignments and, thus, the opportunity for better accountability of performance.

I do not claim that my proposals will solve all of our defense problems, but these or similar major changes can set us on the right course. Congressional action is needed on these organizational issues—the most important defense problem facing our nation. Additional money is badly needed for defense, but without major realignment, we will neither achieve the necessary capability nor spend the money as wisely as we should. The critical question is whether we will show the wisdom to do as the British did, or whether we will muddle along as we have in the past until some crisis or disaster awakens us to the need for change.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, there is a vote on the Senate floor. Therefore, I will suspend the committee for about 10 minutes and go vote and return, hopefully with some of my colleagues in tow, to hear the remainder of the testimony.

So the committee will suspend subject to the call of the Chair.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

We have heard from General Jones. Now I would like General Taylor to testify. I think he is one of the most distinguished people in the military history of the United States. We feel privileged to have you here, General, and we appreciate your willingness to make a contribution to the record for us on this important subject.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor?

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to state my views regarding the need for reform, remake, or to replace the present Joint Chiefs of Staff system in view of its record of performance over the last 30-odd years.

To reveal my position without delay, I favor major changes, a conclusion derived from personal experience on the JCS as Army Chief of Staff and Chairman and from reflection and discussion of this subject over subsequent years.

It is my opinion that the record available to this committee indicates the presence of at least three major flaws in the JCS system. First, the failure of the Chiefs to carry out satisfactorily their statutory obligation to serve as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Second, a lack of clarity in defining the relationship between the National Command Authorities, consisting essentially of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and within the chain of command leading from the President eventually to the commanders of the combatant commands to whom I shall refer as the CINC's. And three, the absence of a military staff capable of supporting the Secretary of Defense in his military duties both in the National Command Authorities and as head of the Department of Defense.

I propose to discuss these subjects in sequence.

By far the most serious of the flaws is the first one, the inadequacy of the Chiefs as senior military advisers. Their advice is needed at the separate but overlapping levels of policymaking and execution. On the top level, the President as Chief Executive surveys the various forms of national power, including the military, available to him for integration into a power aggregate capable of supporting the goals of the national policy as he intends to pursue it.

At this level he will need military advice in reaching decisions on such matters as the foreign military threats that may oppose or endanger his national objectives, and the role that the military may be required to play in overcoming such threats.

After making tentative decisions on these points he should then provide the Secretary of Defense with guidance sufficient to allow the latter to proceed with the formulation of an appropriate military policy. The latter must be consistent with the goals of national policy, the guidance given by the President, and the capability of the Armed Forces in being and the Department of Defense to carry it out.

To execute these tasks the Secretary of Defense will himself need military advice of several kinds. One would expect him to look to his principal military advisers, at present the JCS, for recommendations as to the strategic tasks the Armed Forces should be prepared to carry out to meet the anticipated threats, the force structure necessary to execute these tasks, and the resources needed by the individual services to do their part in generating and maintaining this force structure.

In addition to matters relating to policymaking and force generation, the Secretary is confronted daily by an endless flow of problems related to current forces in being, both those under the CINC's in the combatant commands and those under the authority of the service secretaries.

He needs continuing military advice regarding such matters as the missions to assign the commands, the resources to allocate to them, the state of their task readiness, and the sufficiency of their budgets.

This listing of the Secretary's duties and his needs for advice draws attention to the dual character of his activities. On the one hand, as a Cabinet member responsible for a large department, he is the head of a vast plant for the generation and maintenance of military power. On the other, as a member of the National Command Authority, he is a civilian military leader and de facto Deputy Commander in Chief just below the President in the chain of command.

In his role as department head he receives staff and adviser support from the large, mostly civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his role as Deputy Commander in Chief in the National Command Authorities he must presently borrow staff support from the Joint Staff of the JCS.

Now, to return to the JCS and their advisory responsibilities, in my opinion they have rarely, if ever, performed an advisory role of any importance at the top level of national policy. At the National Command Authorities and secretarial levels, their contribution has been spotty, varying with different Secretaries and sets of Chiefs. Now, what accounts for a record which on the whole is less than satisfactory?

I can cite three causes that have certainly contributed. In the first place, often Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have not wanted the military around during policymaking, so the Chiefs have not been asked to the party. Second, their civilian superiors have rarely transmitted to them the timely political guidance needed for them to form solid judgments which might influence the policy decisions of senior officials. And finally, the Chiefs have rarely complained about the foregoing conditions.

Why this diffidence on the part of the Chiefs? The fact is that the Chiefs have traditionally been loath to volunteer advice to higher authority, particularly if its substance would impinge seriously upon service interests. In my day the slogan in the JCS was "Just answer the mail" and nothing more.

Let me interject that it would not be fair to attribute this reticence largely to service self-interest. Despite frequent disclaimers, service chiefs have been chronically overloaded by the combination of their service and joint responsibilities. Even if they had the inclination, they would have little time to ponder over long-term national problems or develop strong opinions on future military policy which they might later convert into formal JCS advice. With plenty of day-to-day problems for which they are presently responsible, most Chiefs have remained content to answer the mail and reserve such advice as they may offer to influence matters of current interest.

Now, to pass to the second flaw that I mentioned, the lack of clarity in defining relations within the National Command Authorities and the chain of command. One could reasonably expect to find all necessary information on this subject in the National Security Act of 1947 and its various amendments, but such is not the case.

While the language of the act clearly establishes the authority of the Secretary as a department head, it includes no specific mention of his responsibilities in the National Command Authorities or chain of command. The only authoritative reference to the National Command Authorities is found in the following language of the Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.3 of December 2, 1971. It defines the National Command Authorities as follows:

> **The NCA consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the JCS to the commanders of unified and specified commands.**

According to this directive, the Secretary of Defense is clearly second in the chain of command to the President, but the phrase "through the JCS" renders their role uncertain in the chain.

This language may be interpreted to mean that the Chiefs are just one more echelon below the Secretary in the channel of developing command authority, and presumably could issue orders to the CINC's in their own corporate name. However, that interpretation is challenged by a passage in the 1947 act which seems to absolve the Chiefs from responsibility for the execution of missions by the CINC's, a task they would have if they were truly in the chain.

This rather tedious discussion has been necessary to justify my opinion that a real need exists for clarifying relationships in this critical NCA area. Among the most important questions that arise and require resolution are the following.

Is the Secretary of Defense by law a permanent authority in the chain of command? If so, does he remain so in time of war? Can the President relieve him at any time from his present responsibilities in the National Command Authorities and the chain of command, or are not the Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command? If so, can they issue orders in their own corporate name and to whom? If not, should they be in the chain?

I will indicate my position on these points as I go along.

The third and final flaw in the JCS system is the failure to give the Secretary of Defense a military staff of his own. As I mentioned earlier, for departmental matters he already has a largely civilian staff, whereas in discharging his NCA responsibilities he must depend on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their joint staff.

I believe that the testimony available to this committee affords ample evidence of the inadequacy of this jerry-built arrangement, and the Secretary's need for a joint military staff in dealing with the National Command Authorities and also with many departmental matters.

So much for the outstanding weakenesses of the present JCS system and some of the consequences. They constitute my reason for feeling that the defects of the system are so fundamental as to eliminate any hope that a little organizational tinkering will be enough to set things right; hence, the rather drastic proposals I am about to offer.

As a first step, I would dissolve the present JCS organization and free the Chiefs of their joint responsibilities. They could then be free to give their undivided attention to their services and the presentation of service requirements through their secretaries to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.

I would next make provision for the military staff support that the Secretary presently lacks. To do this I would transfer to the Secretary the present Joint Staff of the Chiefs renamed the Joint Military Staff, NCA, and remodeled to meet the Secretary's particular needs.

It would be headed by the Chief of Staff, National Command Authorities, who would be the senior officer of the Armed Forces, the immediate subordinate of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command, and a regular member of the National Security Council. He would be the principal military adviser to the President and the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense on matters related to current military policy strategy and major DOD programs.

He would have two Deputy Chiefs of Staff chosen from services other than his own, one for policy, plans, and operations; the other for resources, logistics, and budget.

Chairman TOWER. Would you yield at that point, General Taylor?

We are operating under some time constraints here today. You have a very comprehensive and I think an extremely important statement. I wonder if you would permit us to insert the rest of your statement in the record, and perhaps you would care to summarize it for us.

General TAYLOR. May I have time to comment on the bill that is before you?

Chairman TOWER. Please do. And we will enter your statement in its entirety in the record.

General TAYLOR. Let me mention the most conspicuous defects of the House bill.

It should not be surprising that for one holding the opinions I have expressed, the House bill 6954 is most disappointing because of the failure to come to grips with the major defects in the system I have cited, the three points I have made.

It does nothing to provide the Secretary of Defense with adequate military staff support or to clarify his responsibilities in the chain of command. Its only contribution to the improvement of military advice is the creation of the Senior Strategic Advisory Board [SSAB], while retaining the JCS as the "principal military advisers to the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense."

There is no reason to believe that the JCS under the bill would perform this advisory function any better than now, which is not good enough.

The following are a few conspicuous defects of the Senior Strategic Advisory Board. The stated mission is inadequate. Also, its composition, it is composed of 10 retired four-star generals and admirals. This makes the board too large for operational efficiency and for the assured quality among its members.

The experience required for membership so limits choice that many of our best minds are likely to be excluded. Under the terms of the bill, among those disqualified would be former Vice Chiefs of Staff, many officers who won their four stars by commanding important uni-service organizations such as the Army Forces Command, the Navy Materiel Command, and the Air Force Command in Europe. Also ineligible would be the commandants of the four war colleges and other senior schools where more serious military thinking per capita probably takes place than anywhere in the Pentagon or the senior overseas headquarters.

Unfortunately, neither stars nor former duty assignments guarantee in an officer the qualities most needed by an effective military adviser. In addition to an impressive military record, the latter should have such attributes as breadth of mind, clarity of thought and expression, and a ready appreciation of the civilian point of view. Wise military counsel is unavailing unless he can persuade civilian decisionmakers.

My overall conclusion regarding the board is that without extensive modification, it would merely add one more source of military advice of uncertain quality, which, along with that coming from the Joint Chiefs, would increase the confusion of advice recipients and further reduce their respect for military counsel.

Without an advisory board that will offset the inadequacies of the Joint Chiefs, there is no justification for the bill itself. Except for the advisory board, which I have criticized, most of the changes contained in the bill are trivial ones which could be affected by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without legislation.

Indeed, it would be damaging to national security if this bill in its present form became law. If passed, it would foster a general belief that Congress after months of study had found and corrected such weaknesses as may have existed in the Joint Chiefs system and henceforth there would be no cause for public concern. Thereafter, there would be little chance for true reform for another decade or so.

For the foregoing reasons, I hope that this committee will give the House bill the close attention it deserves and reject it.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Taylor.

[The prepared statement of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S.A. (Ret.) follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, U.S.A. (RET.)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to state my views regarding the need to reform, remake or replace the present Joint Chiefs of Staff system in view of its record of performance over the last thirty-odd years. To reveal my position without delay, I favor major changes, a conclusion derived from personal experience on the JCS (Army Chief of Staff 1955–59; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1962–64) and from reflection and discussion of the subject over subsequent years.

It is my opinion that the record available to this Committee indicates the presence of at least three major flaws in the JCS system:

a. The failure of the Chiefs to carry out satisfactorily their statutory obligation to serve as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.

b. A lack of clarity in defining the relationships within the National Command Authorities (NCA), consisting essentially of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and within the chain of command leading from the President eventually to the commanders of the combatant commands to whom I shall refer as the CINCs.

c. The absence of a military staff capable of supporting the Secretary of Defense in his military duties both in the NCA and as head of the Department of Defense.

I propose to discuss these three subjects in sequence.

By far the most serious of the flaws is the first one—the inadequacy of the Chiefs as senior military advisers. Their advice is needed at the separate, but overlapping, levels of policy making and execution. On the top level, the President as Chief Executive surveys the various forms of national power, including the military, available to him for integration into a power aggregate capable of supporting the goals of the national policy he intends to pursue. At this level, he will need military advice in reaching decisions on such matters as the foreign military threats that may oppose or endanger his national objectives and the role that the military may be required to play in overcoming such threats. After making tentative decisions on these points, he should then provide the Secretary of Defense with guidance sufficient to allow the latter to proceed with the formation of an appropriate military policy. The latter must be consistent with the goals of national policy, the guidance given by the President and the capability of the Armed Forces in being and the Department of Defense to carry it out.

To execute these tasks, the Secretary of Defense will himself need military advice of several kinds. One would expect him to look to his principal military advisers, at present the JCS, for recommendations as to the strategic tasks the Armed Forces should be prepared to carry out to meet the anticipated threats, the force structure necessary to execute these tasks, and the resources needed by the individual services to do their part in generating and maintaining this force structure.

In addition to matters relating to policymaking and force generation, the Secretary is confronted daily by an endless flow of problems related to current forces in being, both those under the CINNs in the combatant commands and those under the authority of the Services Secretaries. He needs continuing military advice regarding such matters as the missions to assign the commands, the resources to allocate to them, the state of their task readiness and the sufficiency of their budgets.

This listing of the Secretary's duties and his needs for advice draws attention to the dual character of his activities. On the one hand, as a cabinet member responsible for a large department, he is the head of a vast plant for the generation and maintenance of military power. On the other, as a member of the NCA, he is a civilian military leader and defacto Deputy Commander in Chief just below the President in the chain of command. In his role as department head, he receives staff and advisor support from the large, mostly civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his role as Deputy Commander in Chief in the NCA, he must presently "borrow" staff support from the Joint Staff of the JCS.

Now to return to the JCS and their advisory responsibilities. In my opinion, they have rarely, if ever, performed an advisory role of any importance at the top level of national policy. At the NCA and Secretarial levels, their contribution has been spotty, varying with different Secretaries and sets of Chiefs. What accounts for a record which on the whole has been less than satisfactiry?

I can cite three causes that have certainly contributed. In the first place, often Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have not wanted the military around during policymaking so the Chiefs have not been asked to the party. Secondly, their civilian superiors have rarely transmitted to them the timely political guidance needed for them to form solid judgments which might influence the policy decisions of senior officials. Finally, the Chiefs have rarely complained about the foregoing conditions. Why this diffidence on their part?

The fact is that the Chiefs have traditionally been loathe to volunteer advice to higher authority, particularly if its substance would impinge seriously upon service interests. In my day, the slogan in the JCS was "just answer the mail" and nothing more.

Let me interject that it would not be fair to attribute this reticence largely to service self-interest. Despite frequent disclaimers, service Chiefs have been chronically overloaded by the combination of their service and joint responsibilities. Even if they had the inclination, they would have little time to ponder over long-term national problems or develop strong opinions on future military policy which they might later convert into formal JCS advice. With plenty of day-to-day problems for which they are personally responsible, most Chiefs have remained to "answer the mail," and reserve such advice as they may offer to influence matters of current interest.

To pass now to the second flaw—the lack of clarity in defining relations within the NCA and the chain of command. One could reasonably expect to find all the necessary information on this subject in the National Security Act of 1947 and its various amendments, but such is not the case. While the language of the Act clearly establishes the authority of the Secretary as a department head, it includes no specific mention of his responsibilities in the NCA or chain of command.

The only authoritative reference to the NCA is found in the following language of the Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.3, December 2, 1971:

Paragraph 3 Definitions.

"A. National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the JCS to the commanders of unified and specified commands."

According to this departmental directive, the Secretary of Defense is clearly second in the chain of command to the President but the phrase "through the JCS" renders their role uncertain in the chain. This language may be interpreted to mean that the Chiefs are just one more echelon below the Secretary in the channel of devolving command authority and presumably could issue orders to the CINCs in their own corporate name. However, that interpretation is challenged by a passage in Section 202 (j) of the Act that seems to absolve the Chiefs from responsibility for the execution of missions by the CINCs—a task they would have if truly in the chain.

This rather tedious discussion has been necessary to justify my opinion that a real need exists for clarifying relationships int his critical NCA area. Among the most important questions that arise and require resolution are the following:

a. Is the Secretary of Defense by law a permanent authority in the chain of command?

b. If so, does he remain so in time of war?

c. Can the President relieve him at any time from his present responsibilities in the NCA and the chain of command?

d. Are or are not the Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command? If so, can they issue orders in their own corporate name and to whom? If not, should they be in the chain?

I will indicate my position on these points shortly.

The third and final flaw in the JCS system, is the failure to give the Secretary of Defense a military staff of his own. As I mentioned earlier, for departmental matters, he already has a largely civilian staff, whereas, in discharging his NCA responsibilities, he must depend on the JCS and their Joint Staff. I believe that the testimony available to this committee affords ample evidence of the inadequacy of this jerry-built arrangement and the Secretary's need for a joint military staff in dealing with NCA and many departmental matters.

So much for the outstanding weaknesses of the present JCS system and some of the consequences. They constitute my reason for feeling that the defects of the system are so fundamental as to eliminate any hope that a little organizational tinkering will be enough to set things aright. Hence the rather drastic proposals I am about to offer.

As a first step, I would dissolve the present JCS organization and free the Chiefs of their joint responsibilities. They could then be free to give their undivided attention to their services and the presentation of service requirements through their secretaries to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress.

I would next make provision for the military staff support that the Secretary presently lacks. To do this, I would transfer to the Secretary the present Joint Staff of the Chiefs, renamed the Joint Military Staff, NCA and remodeled to meet the Secretary's particular needs. It would be headed by the Chief of Staff, NCA who would be the senior officer of the Armed Forces, the immediate subordinate of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command and a regular member of the NSC. He would be the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense on matters related to current military policy, strategy and major DOD programs. He would have two Deputy Chiefs of Staff chosen from services other than his own, one for policy, plans and operations; the other for resources, logistics and budget.

The Joint Military Staff, composed of officers drawn from all services in appropriate numbers, would be organized along conventional military lines with staff sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, plans, logistics and budget. In serving the Secretary, the staff would deal extensively with matters affecting the CINCs and their commands—the drafting of orders, directives and strategic guidance for them, the review of their war and contingency plans, the verification of the task readiness of their forces and the adequacy of their resources to carry out their assigned tasks. It would support the Chief of Staff, NCA, in his advisory activities mentioned below, providing him with data, staff studies and estimates.

The Chief of Staff, in addition to supervising the Joint Military Staff, would be prepared to advise the Secretary of Defense on all major matters relating to the current forces, their programs and budgets. In rendering such advice, the Chief of Staff would maintain close contact with the service Chiefs of Staff, giving close attention to their views and recommendations.

Having provided the Secretary with an appropriate military staff, we can pass to the dominant problem of satisfying the needs of the President and the Secretary of Defense for mid- and long-term advice on matters pertaining to national policy, military policy and their NCA responsibilities. You will recall the length and variety of the list of subjects presented earlier in this paper (pp. 2–3) for which these officials may need advisory assistance.

Where should they turn for the advice they have not been receiving from the JCS? My recommendation is to form a National Military Council (NMC) consisting of a chairman and not more than five members. Usually they would be respected multi-star officers retired or about to retire; however, they might include one or more civilians with particularly impressive credentials.

The primary mission of the NMC would be to provide the President, NSC and the Secretary of Defense with individual and group advice, comments and criticisms in the field of future national and military policy and strategy. Examples of likely subjects for study, investigation and recommendation would include:

a. The linkage necessary between military and foreign policy.

b. The success of the NSC in integrating various forms of national power for a common purpose.

The effects of the following factors on national security:

(1) The present imbalance between the readiness of U.S. strategic and conventional forces.

(2) The neglect of logistic factors in most contingency planning.

(3) The widespread proliferation of nuclear and high technology conventional weapons and the effects on national security.

(4) Arms control policy—goals, acceptable reductions.

(5) Consequences of world population growth on national security.

(6) Growing dependence of the U.S. economy on overseas markets.

(7) Third World anti-Americanism—its effects on trade.

(8) International terrorism—adequacy of present plans and means to counter.

The foregoing subjects all look to the future. The NMC would also have a shorter range mission—the task of observing and reporting to the NCA on the implementation of current military policy and programs by the DOD and the CINCs.

The Chairman, while participating in Council work like any other member, would preside over sessions, prepare the agenda for meetings, assign study tasks and assure a balanced workload and a timely completion of tasks. The Council would be expected both to initiate advice and to respond promptly to requests for advice from the President, the Secretary of Defense or the NSC. There would be no special effort to obtain unanimity in Council papers which could represent the views of an individual, a group or the entire Council. Its practices would resemble more those of a tribunal like the Supreme Court than those of the present JCS.

It is of interest to compare the relative authority and importance of the Chief of Staff, NCA and the Chairman, NMC, under this concept. The Chief of Staff would be a powerful figure by virtue of his senior rank, his position in the command chain and his frequent and intimate contacts with the President and the Secretary of Defense. Such contacts would give him the opportunity to air his opinions on many subjects to his superiors and thereby exert a considerable influence on their views.

The NMC Chairman would be a somewhat lesser figure, exercising no authority over his fellow members except insofar as he would regulate the conduct and flow of Council business. But the supervisory responsibility of the Council for observing and reporting to the NCA on current policy implementation would place the Chairman in a strong position from which to praise or criticize the activities of the Chief. Thus each position would to some extent counterbalance the other.

I have now reached the end of this overly long presentation. Let me summarize my recommendations for correcting the three major flaws in the JCS system.

A. INADEQUATE MILITARY ADVICE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(1) To improve the military advice reaching the President and the Secretary of Defense, there would be two clearly defined sources. For matters of future policy and strategy, the tribunal-like NMC would be the primary source; for current policy strategy and major DOD activities, the Chief of Staff, NCA, assisted by the Joint Military Staff, would be the primary source. Both sources would be responsible for originating advice as well as for responding to requests for it.

(2) The relief of Service Chiefs from their present joint duties would not only permit them to do full justice to their departmental responsibilities, but also would remove much of the discoloraiton of service bias from the military advice reaching the President and Secretary of Defense.

B. CONFUSION OF RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE NCA AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

The present confusion would be relieved in the following ways:

(1) The elimination of the JCS as a statutory body would remove it from a position in or near the chain of command which a committee is ill-fitted to occupy. Any committee, by its nature, is slow and ponderous and its members prone to dilatory decisions and ambiguous compromises. Such a body has no placed in a military organization like the NCA where at any moment the President may have to act swifty on matters of global importance and will benefit only by advice which is prompt and incisive.

(2) Confusion would be further dissipated by the establishment of the position of the Chief of Staff, NCA with a clear relationship to the President, Secretary of Defense and the combatant commands. Henceforth these commands should profit greatly from better supervision and support from authorities in Washington.

C. STAFF SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In discharging his dual obligations to the NCA in the Department of Defense, the Secretary would henceforth be adequately served by the Joint Military Staff, NCA, completely at his disposition.

In combination, the foregoing changes should strengthen the hand of the President both as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. It should do likewise for the Secretary of Defense in his dual roles. Our senior leadership, civil and military should be encouraged by the prospect of obtaining improved and timely military advice. All parties should be happy over the clarification of present ambiguities in the channel of command. I hope that the Senate will see fit to give legal status to the proposed changes which promise these improvements.

May I close with a few comments on H.R. 6954? It should not be surprising that, for one holding the opinions I have expressed, H.R. 6954 is most disappointing because of its failure to come to grips with the major defects in the JCS system which I have cited. It does nothing to provide the Secretary of Defense with adequate military staff support or to clarify his responsibilities in the chain of command. Its only contribution to the improvement of military advice is the creation of a Senior Strategic Advisory Board (SSAB) while retaining the JCS as the "principal military advisers of the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense." There is no reason to believe that the JCS under the bill would perform this advisory function any better than now—which is not good enough.

Let me mention the most conspicuous defects of the SSAB:

a. The stated mission of the board is inadequate. As was the case with the Joint Chiefs, the advisory efforts of the board upon the untended fields of policy-making, strategic task formulation and force structuring in consonance with the assigned tasks. Indeed, the inclusion in the advisory mission of military tactics—i.e., the employment of forces in combat—appears to direct the attention of the board downward toward the battlefield rather than upward to the heights of national strategy and global logistics.

b. Composed of ten retired four-star generals and admirals, the Board is too large for operational efficiency or for an assured quality of the members. The experience required for membership so limits choice that many of our best minds are likely to be excluded. Among those disqualified would be former vice chiefs of staff, many officers who have won their four stars by commanding important uni-service organizations such as the Army Forces Command, the

Navy Materiel Command and the Air Force Command in Europe. Also ineligible would be the commandants of the four war colleges and other senior schools where more serious military thinking per capita probably takes place than anywhere in the Pentagon or the senior overseas headquarters.

Unfortunately, neither stars nor former duty assignments guarantee in an officer the qualities most needed by an effective military adviser. In addition to an impressive military record, the latter should have such attributes as breath of mind, clarity of thought and expression and a ready appreciation of the civilian point of view. Wise military counsel is unavailing unless it can persuade civilian decisionmakers.

c. My overall conclusion regarding the board is that without extensive modification it would merely add one more source of military advice of uncertain quality, which, along with that coming from the Joint Chiefs, would increase the confusion of advice recipients and further reduce their respect for military counsel. Without an advisory board that will offset the inadequacy of the Joint Chiefs, there is no justification for the bill itself. Except for the SSAB, most of the changes contained in it are trivial ones that could be effected by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs without legislation.

Indeed, it would be damaging to national security if this bill, in its present form, became law. Its passage would foster a general belief that Congress, after months of study, had found and corrected such weaknesses as may have existed in the Joint Chiefs system and henceforth there will be no cause for public concern. Thereafter there would be little chance of true reform for another decade or so.

For the foregoing reasons, I hope that this committee will give H.R. 6954 the close attention it deserves—and reject it.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral Holloway?

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III, USN (RETIRED)

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am particularly honored and pleased to appear before this committee today to discuss the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because this issue, in my opinion, can have as profound and far-reaching consequences as any other single matter that has been considered by the Armed Services Committees of this Congress.

It is true that the issue does not involve weapons or strategies, but it does concern our ability to select the proper weapons and to effect the best strategies for the survival of our Nation.

Our approach to a national military command structure must be fully consistent with our national ideals and democratic form of government. What would work for a totalitarian regime will not be acceptable to the American people. The twin foundations of national policy governing the concepts of a national military command structure for the United States are: First, that it will produce the correct military decisions for the survival of this country; second, that it will preserve the democratic principles of civilian control.

I will get to my point quickly by saying that in my opinion, H.R. 6954 in one single piece of legislation will violate the safeguards for the assurance of civilian control and substantially reduce the opportunity for arriving at the best military decisions crucial to our national survival.

To explain my rationale for this conclusion, let me summarize the main features of the proposed legislation, and there are three of them. First, it would strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman. Second, it would transfer the allegiance of the Joint Staff to the JCS Chairman and further enhance the power of that individual. Third, it would diminish the position of the service chiefs as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Congress in their role as members of the JCS.

How specifically does each of these result from the proposed legislation? The role of the Chairman is significantly strengthened by providing a four-star Deputy who becomes the Chairman's alter ego. The proposal does require the Deputy to be from a different service than the Chairman, but a Deputy by definition is responsible to reflect the views, the policies and the decisions of the principal.

The Chairman and his Deputy becomes a single entity, always available to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense and the President for the presentation of military advice, and that effectively eliminates the opportunity for the other service chiefs to deal directly with the NCA.

The allegiance of the Joint Staff is effectively transferred to the Chairman from the JCS by three new provisions of the proposed act. First, the Chairman would be responsible for selecting officers on the Joint Staff. Second, the Chairman would manage the Joint Staff and its director in the performance of their duties. Third, the Chairman would screen the candidates from all services for three- and four-star assignments through his personal evaluation of the performance of those officers while they served on the Joint Staff.

Finally, the function of the service chiefs as the principal military advisers to the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense through their role as members of the JCS is very severely curtailed. There has been interposed a Deputy Chairman, which means that individual members of the JCS will no longer ever perform the duties of Acting Chairman in the absence of the CJCS. They will not participate in discussions with the President and the National Security Council in that role.

The lines of communication between the Joint Chiefs to the Joint Staff are essentially eliminated. By making the Joint Staff responsible only to the Chairman, the members of the JCS would lose an avenue of input that now contributes to the Chairman's decisions as they do through the current staffing process.

The 85th Congress, reporting on the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958, said, and I am going to quote because I couldn't find any words as good as these to express my point:

> Nothing in the proposed legislation or elsewhere in the law sets the Chairman apart from the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or makes the Joint Staff his servant rather than the servant of the corporate body. The loyalty of the Joint Staff must be to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> The Joint Staff must not become the personal preserve of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Were this to happen, it would constitute a loan and probably final step toward an overall armed forces general staff.

All of these individually will enhance the authority of the Chairman of the JCS, and collectively they will enormously increase the power of one single military individual. As the power of the Chairman expands and the supporting staff is increasingly subordinated to reflect only the Chairman's views, the Secretary of Defense and the President become isolated from all military points of view but that of the Chairman.

The civilian authority, instead of retaining command, in effect abrogates that authority to the Chairman of the JCS because it has no alternative to the military advice provided by the Chairman of the JCS.

One of the purported advantages of the proposed reorganization is that it would streamline the decisionmaking process and provide for quicker decisions. This may be true, but only at the expense of eliminating consideration of alternatives which will ultimately lead to better decisions. This is not good. No rational person, I think you would agree, would want a quick decision, regardless of whether it was right or wrong.

The proper philosophy is: We should seek the right decision and we should make that decision in time for it to be effective. To suppress debate solely for the purpose of streamlining the decisionmaking process is, in my view, irresponsible. The objective in reorganizing a national military command structure must not simply be to create a mechanism for the elimination of controversy.

There is another reason why the service chiefs should not be removed even partially from the function of military advisers. To do so would separate authority and responsibility. The service chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training their forces; the Chairman is not. Because they are responsible for the readiness and performance of those units, the chiefs must therefore be involved in the chain of command to the authority that directs the employment of those forces.

The Congress has long recognized that to separate responsibility and authority leads to an impossible system of accountability. It would result in a military establishment totally out of control.

Let me again quote the views of the Congress on this point accompaning the Defense Procurement Authorization of 1968, and I quote:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is considered by most authorities to be the finest military decisionmaking body in the world because it brings together the views of the four separate services and combines the responsibility for planning with responsibility for execution.

There are other features of H.R. 6954 other than those that I have discussed so far. These other provisions deal mainly with altering the rules for tenure on the Joint Staff and the establishment of a Senior Strategy Advisory Board. The former would tend to create more of a general staff comprised of officers specializing in headquarters-type duty as opposed to an organization of officers rotating through the staff from field and operational assignments.

I am personally opposed to any military policy that places greater emphasis on headquarters and staff assignments over those of command and duty in combat units in the field.

Another main feature of the proposed legislation provides for a Senior Strategy Advisory Board composed of 10 retired flag or general officers who had previously served as members of the JCS or as unified or specified commanders. I do not see the need for such a committee as the Chairman and the chiefs have available to them really more advice today than they can readily assimilate.

My main recommendation would be that the Congress not attempt to reorganize the national military command structure or the JCS system for reform's sake. We do have a system that is working. It has served us well in the same basic configuration through two major conflicts and decades of cold war with the Soviet Union, during which the United States was vigorously exercising its role of leadership of the Western World. To tinker with this machinery simply on the premise that we might improve it is a most dangerous form of experimentation.

It would be my further recommendation that the Congress not adopt any new legislation without hearing from the current members of the JCS. My impression is the new JCS may have some fresh views.

The overall effect, then, of H.R. 6954 would be to move the traditional philosophy of our national military command system from the democratic principles of civilian control toward the more autocratic concept of a general staff dominated by a single chief of staff.

Historically the Congress has assiduously protected the principle of civilian authority and rejected any proposals that would encourage the development of a general staff type organization dominated by a single powerful military man. The National Security Act of 1947 said:

> In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.

Mr. Chairman, I can think of no better way to complete my statement than to rest upon these views of the Congress, which in my opinion will retain their validity as long as this country remains a republic.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Admiral Holloway.

[The prepared statement by Adm. James L. Holloway III, U.S.N. (Ret.) follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am Admiral James L. Holloway III, U.S. Navy (Retired). From 1 July 1974 through 30 June 1978 I served as Chief of Naval Operations and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am honored and pleased to appear before your Committee today to discuss the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because this issue, in my opinion, can have as profound and far reaching consequences as any other single matter that has been considered by the Armed Services Committees of this Congress. It is true that the issue does not involve weapons or strategies. But it does concern our ability to select the proper weapons and to effect the best strategies for the survival of our nation. Therefore I urge that the resolution of these proposals for JCS reform be undertaken with the utmost care and deliberation.

It is because of the gravity of the potential consequences of these proposals as well as the profound nature of the subject, that I consider that any discussion of the issue must begin with the very fundamentals, not just of the JCS system, but of the philosophy of our national military command structure.

Our approach to a national military command structure must be fully consistent with our national ideals and democratic form of government. What would work for a totalitarian regime will not be acceptable to the American people. The twin foundations of national policy governing the concepts of a national military command structure for the United States are, first that it will produce the correct military decisions for the survival of the United States, and second, that it will preserve the democratic principles of civilian control. Therefore, any proposed reforms to the JCS organization should conform to and support these two principles:

Enhancing the process for the generation of proper military decisions;

Assuring that civilian control is retained over the military establishment of the United States and its operations, both in time of peace and during war.

It is upon this basic premise that I would like to make an evaluation of the JCS organization, with special consideration of the proposals for reform contained in H.R. 6954: The JCS Reorganization Act of 1982.

I will get to my point quickly, by saying that in my opinion H.R. 6954, in one single piece of legislation, both violates the safeguards for the assurance of civilian control, and substantially reduces the opportunity for arriving at the best military decisions crucial to our national survival.

To explain the rationale for this conclusion, I would like to start by summarizing the main features of the proposed legislation. There are three main thrusts:

Strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman;

Transfer the allegiance of the Joint Staff to the JCS Chairman, to further enhance the power of that individual;

Diminish the position of the Service Chiefs as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council and the Congress, in their role as members of the JCS.

How specifically, does each of these result from the proposed legislation?

The role of the Chairman is significantly strengthened by providing a Four Star Deputy who becomes the Chairman's alter ego. Although the proposal requires the Deputy to be from a different service than the Chairman, a deputy by definition is responsible to reflect the views, policies, and decisions of the principal. The Chairman and his Deputy become a single entity, always available to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, for the presentation of military advice, effectively eliminating the opportunities for the other Service Chiefs to deal directly with the NCA.

The allegiance of the Joint Staff is effectively transferred to the Chairman from the JCS by three new provisions of the proposed Act:

The Chairman would be responsible for selecting officers on the Joint Staff;

The Chairman would manage the Joint Staff and its Director in the performance of its duties;

The Chairman would screen the candidates from all services for three and four star assignments through his personal evaluation of their performance on the Joint Staff.

Finally, the function of the Service Chiefs as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, through their role as members of the JCS, is severely curtailed.

There has been interposed a Deputy Chairman, which means that individual members of the JCS will no longer perform the duties of Acting Chairman in the absence of the CJCS, and participate in discussions with the President and the National Security Council. The proposed legislation does provide that dissenting views of a member of the JCS may be presented to the Secretary of Defense or the President in writing, but this is a poor substitute for direct contact, and a heavy additional administrative burden on the decision making process.

By strangulating communications from the Joint Chiefs to the Joint Staff—by making the Joint Staff responsible only to the Chairman—the members of the JCS would lose their avenue of professional input to contribute to the decisions and views of the Chairman as they now do through the staffwork process. Further, when the Chairman controls the staff, it is going to be responsive to the Chairman's predelictions. Advocacy of alternate approaches will be lost. Reasoned debate for alternatives and options is essentially eliminated from Joint Staff deliberations.

All of this will enormously increase the power of a single military individual: enhancing the authority of the Chairman; the creation of a Deputy who will insure a constant preference and availability of the entity of the Chairman; a Joint Staff responsible and loyal only to the bidding of the Chairman; and a significant diminution of the availability of advice and counsel from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by stifling their access to the National Command Authority by the creation of a more powerful Chairman, and through the elimination of their input to the Chairman's decision making process by creating a staff effectively subordinated to the person of the Chairman himself.

As the power of the Chairman expands and the supporting staff is increasingly subordinated to reflect only the Chairman's views, the Secretary of Defense and the President become isolated from all military points of view but that of the Chairman. So that the civilian authority, instead of retaining command, in effect abrogates that authority to the Chairman of the JCS because they have no alternative to the military advice he provides.

Let me now turn to the JCS decision making process. Based upon my personal experience as a member of the JCS, I know of no occasion when the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to provide advice to the National Command Authority in a timely manner. In fast breaking crises, initial recommendations were often based on the sketchiest of information and would tend to be conservative. But as additional intelligence became available, recommendations were continuously refined, and could be substantially altered as a broader understanding of the situation unfolded. But in retrospect, I believe that the advice and recommendations of the JCS were always timely and invariably sound, considering the information in hand when the judgments were made.

One of the purported advantages of the proposed reorganization is that it would streamline the decision making process and provide quicker decisions. It is true that the decision making process would be streamlined, but only at the expense of eliminating the deliberation of considerations and alternatives which would ultimately lead to better decisions. With this streamlined process, decisions are arrived at with less discussion and no real debate. I do not think that this is good. No rational person could want a quick decision regardless of how right or wrong it may be. The proper philosophy should be to seek the right decision, and make that decision in time to be effective. When there is time, as there is in planning or programatic matters, there should be exhaustive debate with all of the Chiefs participating so that no potential alternative goes unconsidered. That is the present system. It insures that the frank and honest views of the four most experienced and competent military men in this nation, are given the most careful consideration in the formulation of military advice. To supress this debate solely for the purpose of "streamlining" the decision making process is, in my view, simply irresponsible. Certainly it would be less frustating to avoid an in-depth examination of the issues by all of the Chiefs and the Joint Staff. It would be obviously less time consuming to have decisions made by the Chairman alone. But the factors that are involved in the security of this country are so complex that no one man alone has the experience or the capacity to deal competently with them all. The objective in organizing a National Military Command Structure cannot be simply to create a mechanism for the elimination of controversy. When challenge and debate are required to arrive at the best decisions in a complex, changing, and imperfect world, the perfect harmony of deliberation is not possible. We must accept the reality of divergent views among our military experts and fashion a system in which those various approaches can be presented to the civilian authority in a manner which facilitates the best decision in the time frame allowed by the contingencies.

There is another relatively simple and perhaps over-riding reason why the Service Chiefs must not be removed even partially from the function of principal military advisors to the National Command Authority in their role as members of the JCS. To do so, would separate authority and responsibility, and experience has demonstrated time and again, this is fatal to the success of military operations. The Service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping and training their forces. The Chairman is not. It is through these responsibilities as well as from their professional lifetime of service experience, that the Chiefs are recognized as the single individuals with the most comprehensive appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the military forces of their respective services. Because they are responsible for the readiness and performance of those units, they must therefore be involved in the chain of command or authority that directs the employment of those forces.

The Congress has long recognized that to separate responsibility and authority leads to an impossible system of accountability. It would result in a military establishment totally out of control. The views of the Congress on this point are very well expressed in the language accompanying the Defense Procurement Authorization of 1968—

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is considered by most authorities to be the finest military decision making body in the world because it brings together the views of the four separate services and combines the responsibility for planning with the responsibility for execution."

There are other features of H.R. 6954 than those that I have discussed thus far. These other provisions deal mainly with altering the rules for tenure on the Joint Staff and the establishment of a Senior Strategy Advisory Board. The former would tend to create more of a general staff, comprised of officers specializing in headquarters type duty as opposed to an organization of officers rotating through the staff from field and operational assignments. I personally am opposed to any military policy that places greater emphasis on headquarters and staff assignments over those of command and duty in combat units in the field.

The other main feature of the proposed legislation provides for a Senior Strategy Advisory Board composed of 10 retired flag or general officers who had previously served as members of the JCS or as Unified or Specified Commanders. I do not see the need for such a Committee, as the Chairman and Chiefs have available to them more sources of advice than they can really assimilate: The Joint Staff, the Chairman's Staff Group, the service staffs, the Unified and Specified Commanders and their staffs, the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and the professional staffs of the Congressional Committees. Furthermore, senior retired officers (and any one else) are always available to be called on for advice. As a matter of record, a number of senior retired officers have served as consultants to the JCS to provide their counsel in both broad strategy and in specialized matters for which they were considered to be uniquely qualified on the basis of their particular experience. If such a group as the Senior Strategic Advisory Board is established, human nature being what it is, the Board will consider it their obligation to provide advice whether it is needed or not, and I cannot for one believe that this additional bureaucratic layer can be helpful.

Mr. Chairman, I have attempted to point out that this proposed legislation would not only fail to strengthen our National Military Command Structure, but would walk away from the fundamental principles upon which our military philosophy is based—civilian control of a system which provides the best decisions to guarantee the security of the nation. It is for these fundamental reasons that I am deeply concerned with the potential consequences of the legislation proposed in H.R. 6954.

That leaves the question of *how* should the JCS be reorganized.

My recommendation would be that the Congress not attempt to reorganize the National Military Command Structure or the JCS system, just for reform sake. We do have a system that is working. It has served us well in its same basic configuration through two major conflicts, and decades of cold war with the Soviet Union during which the United States has vigorously exercised its role of leadership of the western world. To tinker with this machinery simply on the premise that we *might* improve it would be a most dangerous form of experimentation.

I believe that there are solutions to the criticism leveled at the present system which are less drastic than the suggested legisltaion, and would not require a drastic alteration of basic concepts. The main arguments for a four star deputy are predicated on achieving greater continuity in the office of CJCS when the Chairman is to be absent from Washington. An alternative solution to the current proposal, would be to designate one of the Service Chiefs as Alternate Chairman for a fixed period of time, three months for example, and to require that officer to arrange his schedule so that he will be in Washington and available to act as Chairman in the absence of the regularly appointed CJCS. I can say from personal experience that this approach is a practical one. Such an arrangement was used for several years during 1975 and 1976. For that two year period I served as Acting Chairman of the JCS during General George Brown's absences. This system was established at the direction of the president on the advice of the Secretary of Defense, and in my view, worked well. It is a practical approach that has proved quite workable in the past, and does not require a departure from the fundamental tenets of our democratic safeguards.

There will always be the need for some modification in JSC organization and procedures to adapt to changing times and circumstances. But my personal experience leads me to believe that these changes can be relatively minor. By adhering to an evolutionary approach, the Congress can assure itself that the cherished safeguards to our democratic ideals are not inadvertently weakened or destroyed. It would be my further recommendation that the Congress not be precipitious in adopting any new legislation without hearing from the current members of the JCS. My impression is that the problems voiced by General Jones as plaguing his tenure as Chairman, seem to have gone away with the new membership of the organization.

In summary, our present system has stood us well for more than 30 years of shooting conflicts and cold war emergencies in its same basic configuration. Constructive criticism of the National Military Command System is useful, but it would be a mistake to over-react to every proposal. For every change imposed to solve one problem, new problems are introduced. National Security is not an area into which change should be introduced just for reform's sake. Proposals to create a Four Star Deputy and relegate the Joint Staff to position of direct subservience to the Chairman would result in a major shift in the basic concepts of our JCS system. It would largely remove the Service Chiefs from effective participation with the National Command Authority in operational planning, policy, and operations, and would result in a division of responsibility and authority within the JCS, leading to a break-down of accountability within the military establishment.

The overall effect of H.R. 6954 would be to fundamentally move the traditional philosophy of our National Military Command System from the democratic principles of civilian control toward the more autocratic concept of a general staff dominated by a single Chief of Staff. Historically the Congress has assiduously protected the principle of civilian authority and rejected any proposals that would encourage the development of a general staff type of organization dominated by a single powerful military man.

The National Security Act of 1947 says, "Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; . . . but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces nor an overall armed forces general staff."

The House Report 1765, 85th Congress, 2d Session, on the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 said:

"Nothing in the proposed legislation or elsewhere in law, sets the Chairman apart from the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or makes the Joint Staff his servant rather than the servant of the corporate body. The loyalty of the Joint Staff must be to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff must not become the personal preserve of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Were this to happen, it would constitute a long, and probably final, step toward an overall Armed Forces general staff."

"It has, parenthetically, been a concern of the committee, in considering the proposed legislation, lest a defense organization be ultimately created in which power is totally concentrated in the Secretary of Defense only so that it may be wielded and controlled more effectively by a military tier (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff) immediately below him.

"For these and other reasons, Congress has historically rejected an Armed Forces general staff and single Chief of Staff. . . . In response to these fears . . . the original act limited the size of the Joint Staff to 100 officers; provided for its balanced membership among the services; made it responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body: and provided that the director be appointed by, and junior to, the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Mr. Chairman, I can think of no better way to complete my statement than to rest on these views of the Congress, which in my opinion will retain their validity as long as this nation remains a republic.

Chairman TOWER. We will have to suspend again. There is currently a cloture vote on the floor. We will suspend subject to the call of the Chair, which I estimate will occur in about 10 minutes. I would like to put some question to you gentlemen.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

General Jones, in your view, how will the organizational changes that you propose encourage civilian leaders to rely more on professional military officers for advice?

General **Jones**. Mr. Chairman, I believe one reason that the civilian leadership through the years has not turned as much to military advice is because there is not what I would call an integrated effort. They get it by services, the echo plus from the joint system that has taken place for years.

I would like to see a system that would provide the Secretary with true alternatives. There are some very fundamental questions that this Nation should be addressing and some alternatives. When a civilian Secretary is provided with true, well-thought-out alternatives, that Secretary can have more influence.

So I am proposing not a single Chief of Staff, not a general staff. Every time we talk about even minor changes, this issue comes up as though we were going to have a man on horseback and were going to have a general staff. I propose strengthening the role of the civilian authority by giving it alternative advice that cuts services.

Chairman **Tower**. What are the specific problems that you foresee would arise in wartime with the current JCS organization?

General **Jones**. One is inadequate planning and inadequate preparation for conflict. We spend too much time on the scramble for resources and not enough time on oversight of those resources, accountability in the planning of how to use those resources in a way that is integrated with our allies and with our services. There are other factors, too.

Chairman **Tower**. Now, you have suggested that the chain of command be modified to run from the President through the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman to the combatant commands. Now, would this change mean that the JCS Chairman would exercise military command over the unified and specified command?

General **Jones**. No, sir, I would support what General Taylor has recommended. I do not advocate as much. I advocate putting in the law what is already in the directive that the channel goes through the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the language in the law, which ignores that. I am not advocating the Chairman or the Chiefs be independent authorities to direct the forces without Presidential or Secretary of Defense approval.

Chairman **Tower**. General Taylor, what is your response to criticism that your rather far-reaching proposal would lead to an organization similar to a general's staff?

General **Taylor**. Well first, Mr. Chairman, I smile when they bring out that old bugaboo about the man on horseback. In fact, I know of no officer who can ride a horse at the present time. That is proof that that is dated. In all seriousness, that has been riding around here for too long. All I am asking is to have proper military advice at the right time to our civilian leader. They are not getting it now. That is the entire proposition that I make.

Chairman **Tower**. Thank you, General Taylor.

Admiral Holloway, I happen to be one of those who has been concerned in the past that our civilian officials have not relied enough on professional military advice. Now, if you don't support any organizational changes that have been proposed this morning, how will you enhance the role of military leaders in national security decisionmaking?

Admiral **Holloway**. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that in my view the principal reason that civilian leadership did not take the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 8 or 9 years, other than the last several years, was because the Chiefs were not giving advice that the civilian leadership wanted to hear.

The Chiefs were being asked to give the administration a plan that would keep us just as strong militarily or make us stronger, but to spend less money. The Chiefs, and I am very proud of the fact that they did, said that is simply not possible, in our view. I think that this accusation, which we have heard over the past decade, that the Chiefs give bad advice, is simply a euphemism for saying the Chiefs aren't giving us the answers we want to hear. Therefore we will set aside their advice and go to Brookings. We will go to someone else who will tell us how to have a much more powerful military force and only spend half as much money.

I believe that the present organization and concept is a sound one. We are always going to run into problems of difficulties of the times, that is the National Command Authority not relying on the Chiefs for reasons such as I have given. So there may be some evolutionary changes necessary in the JCS itself to accommodate to changing times.

The major criticism that has been levied against the system is that there is no continuity. I would handle that by having one of the members of the JCS serve as alternate Chairman for a period of 3 to 6 months. That service chief, during the period that he is designated as alternate Chairman, would arrange his schedule so he would always be available to serve as acting Chairman in the absence of the actual Chairman.

It has been done before. I served in that capacity for 2 years, from 1975 to 1977, and I, very frankly, did not feel that I was overburdened. I was able to plan my schedule accordingly and I felt that I was both a better service chief because of this opportunity to serve as acting Chairman 25 percent of the time, and I believe that I brought to the chairmanship the views of a service chief that could be quite useful in that capacity.

I don't advocate one officer being in the job of alternate Chairman as long as a year. I think 3 months would probably be a better period of time. That would be my principal recommendation.

Chairman **Tower**. Thank you, Admiral.

Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I commend each of you for coming forward with your respective views. I think it is wise from time to time that this whole subject be carefully reviewed and aired, and General Jones, you gave the spark to start that.

My first question is to you, General Jones. Recently there was a very dramatic hearing in connection with the strategic systems: principally the MX. I thought one of your successors in office, General Vessey, was very courageous when he spoke with complete candor with respect to the views of the Chiefs and the diversity of those views with the administration.

Would the system that you propose encourage or discourage such candor?

General JONES. I think it would encourage much more crisp advice, to include advice on differences. Today, and it has taken place ever since 1945, the main threat is in getting a consensus; and only a few times, two or three times a year, are there dissents, and by then all the staffs have exerted pressure to get together.

The provision I propose is that the Chairman would present his advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President, with inputs from the CINC's and the Chiefs. The Chiefs, of course, on items of their service interest would go through their service secretaries. But if any service chief felt strongly about a joint issue, he would have the right to go to either the Secretary of Defense or the President. It is much crisper if I give you advice and if Jim does not agree with me that he gives you advice rather than we all agree on a paper except for an occasional footnote of differences. There would be more fixed responsibility.

So I am encouraging including alternative advice I do not exclude the other service chiefs from input, but not so much a committee action of consensus. The Chairman would have to stand on his advice and have to take into consideration what the Chiefs say, knowing full well that if he rejects their advice out of hand, Chief is likely to go to the Secretary with his own advice. So I don't cut the Chiefs out in any way.

Senator WARNER. I think my point was more to the relationship between a Chief or Chiefs and the public with respect to those views which are in disagreement with the civilian leaders in the Pentagon.

General JONES. And I would add in this regard, Senator Warner, when a Chief came over here to testify, and was asked that question, I would see the same result. If the Chairman were asked did you get the advice from the service chiefs, what was that advice, I would expect the Chairman to say, two of them would do this and two of them would do that, and one of them felt strongly enough to put it in writing that he disagreed, and here was the disagreement.

So, I think you would get crisper advice and more thought on alternatives.

Chairman TOWER. Admiral, we will have to suspend. There is another vote on the floor. I understand that General Jones has to leave, but if the other two gentlemen would remain——

Senator WARNER. Let me have one more question with the General, then. I understand your recommendations for change were at least in part based on a study by a commercial organization headed by Mr. Bill Brehm. Is that correct?

General JONES. I asked a group of retired officers and through a contract with Mr. Brehm's organization, but I asked because I wanted to get Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine retired officers in an organized way to go around and talk to CINC's, talk to chiefs, talk to action officers all through it, and to come up with recommendations. Yes; and I think they did a good job of coming up with criticism of the system.

Senator WARNER. So you feel that in your preparation for this, that you impartially and fairly sought advice from both uniformed and civilian organizations?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator **Warner**. And that you received, can we say, an objective and balanced input?

General **Jones**. And I leaned heavily, Senator Warner, on the stack of studies, blue ribbon commission studies all the way from 1945 until now. In preparation of my article I read John Collins' report out of the Congressional Office on the deficiencies within the Defense Department. So, I based it on not just my own view, but advice of others.

Senator **Warner**. Admiral Holloway, during recent months our country has been confronted with a continuing crisis in Lebanon. We have responded with our fleet and landed the Marines in the most delicate and volatile of situations. I know that it must involve a great deal of consideration and work by the JCS system, this type of contingency. Now, as a former CNO and chairman of the group investigating the previous crisis, for example, the Iranian crisis, these questions come to my mind.

Do you see any deficiencies of the JCS in operations in connection with the Lebanon crisis?

Admiral **Holloway**. Senator Warner, I do not believe I do. Let me say that in my experience as a member of the JCS, we had a number of crises. The evacuation of Cyprus, the evacuation of Phom Phen, the evacuation of Saigon, the seizure of the Mayaguez, the Korean tree-chopping incident in which two Army officers were murdered. These were crises which in most cases were anticipated. They required rapid action on the part of the JCS, and if my recollection serves me right, and I think it does, I would say that the JCS was always 4 hours to several days ahead of the NCA requirements

Senator **Warner**. We have to interrupt.

[Recess.]

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to finish the question that I directed to Admiral Holloway prior to the vote. We were discussing the role of the JCS in connection with various crises. I selected Lebanon as an example. And the Admiral had finished the answer to that.

The second question would be: Is there anything in the proposed bill which in your view might improve the ability of the JCS to perform in these crises?

Admiral **Holloway**. Yes, sir, I think that those provisions of the bill that would create a Deputy Chairman, and would put the Joint Staff totally under the control of and responsive to the Chairman would probably provide quicker decisions, but I think not as good decisions as we are getting under the present system.

What we want are the best possible decisions, in time so that they can be effected to influence events. What will happen under this proposed legislation, is that there will be a lack of input of alternatives from all of the services because the Joint Staff will be responsive to the known predilections of the Chairman. They will know he wants to do things a certain way, he likes to use certain forces, and that he operates in a particular style. In these circumstances, in a crisis you get a quick decision but responding only with the Chairman's specialty.

And I believe that there will be many operations in which the Chairman's predilections or methods of operating are not the best, by a long shot.

Senator **Warner**. I find that quite astonishing. You are suggesting that the members of the JCS, after a period of time working with one Chairman, tend to be overly influenced by his, as you say, predilections? I will turn to General Jones in a moment to answer the same question.

But I am interested in that view. I have always felt, in my experience working with the JCS in over 5 years in the Department of Defense, that they were pretty independent individuals, certainly as it relates between the civilian and the uniformed officers. But is there some transformation when you get in the tank and the doors are closed?

Admiral **Holloway**. No, sir, this legislation, the House bill, would provide three things that would, I think, cause the Joint Staff to be virtually owned by the Chairman. First, the Chairman, according to the proposed legislation, controls the membership of the Joint Staff.

Second, it specifies that the Joint Staff works for the Chairman. Now, as you know, currently the Joint Staff works for the JCS.

And third, the Chairman under this proposed legislation would have the authority to, in fact would be required when any three- or four-star officer from any service came up for assignment, to make an input on that individual's suitability based upon his performance on the Joint Staff. All of which, I think, tends to create a Joint Staff that is responsive to only the Chairman.

Senator **Warner**. Fair enough.

General Jones?

General **Jones**. Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. The general subject as I opened it was crises and the ability of the JCS to deal with them. I asked specifically about Lebanon, but of course you choose any one you wish. And then, would this legislation improve the ability of the JCS to perform in such a crisis?

General **Jones**. I think very briefly on Lebanon, it was a very simple operation, straightforward, landing the Marines in a peaceful situation. So it did not really stress the crisis management system at all. So there was no real problem there.

With regard to the broader issue, I find Admiral Holloway—and I must be looking at a different bill because the way I interpret this bill is the way that General Taylor does, that the changes are trivial. Under its provisions the Joint Chiefs would still address all issues. The Joint Staff would still work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is a provision in there that in certain areas—and I am thinking mainly in the programmatic area of the Chairman getting from the Joint Staff advice that does not have to be filtered through all the services. But there is no exclusion that I can read in this bill of the service chiefs from that input.

Most of the things in the bill are done today. The Chairman does provide independent advice at times. Service chiefs in the past have written directly to the President, providing independent advice. So that a channel is available.

Therefore, I think the actual changes in this are very nominal. The biggest one would be the provision of a Deputy Chairman, which could be very helpful in the time of crisis. But also, we do not spend enough time in the field, we do not spend enough time out making sure that the unified commands are integrated. And therefore, you could have better inside and outside work and oversight.

But I do not foresee this as a big step forward, and I agree with General Taylor that if we pass this bill the country might think we have solved the problem. The problems are far greater than this. As I stated in my statement, not just JCS but problems in the Defense Department and problems in Congress.

Chairman TOWER. General, I dislike bringing down the gavel on these hearings.

Senator WARNER. I think perhaps Admiral Holloway should be afforded an opportunity for any further comment he might wish to make.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. No; I think I have presented a very definite view of what the consequences could be. Based upon my experience with human nature, I think they would be just as I suggest, having observed what can happen with individuals in the JCS system.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I want to yield the Chair to Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN [presiding]. I am not sure where we left off. Admiral, did you get through with your testimony completely? We are in the question stage now? Is that right?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. I would summarize what I have said in that I believe that the JCS mechanism is responsive in crisis management situations What has happened in Lebanon to my knowledge, has not indicated any shortcomings of the JCS system. My experience has been that the JCS was always well ahead of the National Command Authority's requirements for timeliness.

The investigation of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt concluded that it would have been better to have followed the prescribed JCS doctrinal approach to organizing, training, and conducting operations for that force than to take the ad hoc route. I support the findings of that report, and that would be my view.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

General Jones, Admiral Holloway, in his prepared statement—this is, I think, the subject we are on now also, although I just got back from the vote. He says, and I quote him:

> Based upon my personal experience as a member of the JCS, I know of no occasion when the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to provide advice to the National Command Authorities in a timely manner.

What is your experience in that regard?

General JONES. I would have to disagree with my good friend, Jim Holloway. Maybe we are looking at it from a different definition of timely advice, but let me give one example. While I was Chairman, there was only one service that was really willing to address the question: If the budget level is *x* billion, what should be the overall program for defense? As a result of objections by other services that question was not addressed. So you could say it was not timely in the sense that that type of advice was not given.

Advice is always given on unconstrained budgets or budgets that are much higher than planned. I think that there are other areas where the process takes too much time. Often we are right up at the deadline, and then there is very little time for the Secretary to make a decision. So I would say it is a slow and tedious process, and that it can be crisper and much more timely.

And I think in issues of everything from the MX to the total budget, it could be better.

Senator NUNN. You may be talking about two different things. It seems to me what Admiral Holloway is talking about, and correct me if I am wrong, you are talking about crisis situations, situations that develop around the world that relate to action or lack of action by the American military forces, and General Jones, what you are talking about, as I understand it, is budgetary-type matters.

General JONES. But I think even in the crises there are deficiencies. For example, in the evacuation of Saigon, there was split command and control: split for the maritime and the land-based, and it ended up they used different execution hours, resulting in helicopters arriving an hour late. It made it much more difficult for the evacuation. So it is not just advice. It is being able to execute complicated operations.

Now, the Lebanon landing was essentially a Department of the Navy action. It was not a joint operation in the sense of all the services involved, as will be required in any major contingency operation. So I think those types of operations are very clearcut, clearcut channels of execution, clearcut channels of advice. The more complicated ones are where the system tends to break down.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, if you just had to list, without getting into details, the major functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now as you envision it now, what would you list as those major functions?

General JONES. I think the one thing the Joint Chiefs are charged with that no one else has the responsibility for is planning for crises, for contingencies, for war, and that is a critical responsibility through the system. I think we do fairly well, but not nearly as well as we should.

Then there are other areas, such as giving advice, that others also participate. In the war planning, we are the only ones. Oversight of the field commands, unified, and specified commands, is another responsibility of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff. But the war planning is the one that no one else can do.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, do you disagree with that? And if so, in what respect? I am just trying to boil down where the agreement is and where the disagreement is.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would have to say that it is very true that the JCS could do their assigned tasks better, but I have to say that is true of everything in Government. I do not know of any way to get the JCS to be more effective in war planning than they are today unless we were to substantially alter the National Military Command structure and the relationship between the President and the National Security Council.

I firmly believe strategy should emanate from the National Security Council, and that it should be a national strategy. Based upon that, the Secretary of Defense and the chiefs should formulate a national military strategy. Essentially, this is being done. Sometimes it is done better than at other times.

Senator NUNN. What I am trying to get at really is where you two disagree on what the Joint Chiefs should do.

Admiral Holloway. The disagreement is that I think the Joint Chiefs are doing their job properly. General Jones, I think, believes that they are not. And yet we both seem to agree that a national strategy, particularly a national military strategy, is not being properly formulated. General Jones appears to be saying it is the fault of the JCS. I am saying it is the fault of the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Nunn. All right. So you are both agreeing that we do not have a mechanism today for the development of a coherent military strategy. Do you both agree on that?

Admiral Holloway. No, sir. I do not agree. I believe that we have the mechanism, but I think that it is not being properly used. In my view we have a national strategy, and we have a national military strategy. Further I think it is about as well defined as you can get it, because there are so many uncertainties in the world.

Senator Nunn. What is wrong then with it not being properly executed?

Admiral Holloway. I believe that the Office of Secretary of Defense, probably beginning at the level of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and including the systems analysts, gets into the Chiefs business too much. This tends to obscure the process and make the development of a coherent strategy too complicated.

Senator Nunn. Would you say that we have too many people involved in the OSD?

Admiral Holloway. I do.

Senator Nunn. And too many Assistant Secretaries?

Admiral Holloway. I do.

Senator Nunn. General Jones, just on that point, I am just trying to get where we agree and disagree out of this. Do you agree with that, that we have too many people in OSD and too many Assistant Secretaries?

General Jones. I agree with that point. I think there are too many people involved, too many people in the Pentagon in total.

Senator Nunn. We have a confirmation hearing on Mr. Cooper right after this. [General laughter.]

It might be a good place to start, Tom. [General laughter.]

General Taylor, what do you say about that? You were there when OSD was much, much narrower in scope. What do you observe about OSD over the years?

General Taylor. I was afraid you were not going to let me in on this. I can assure you we do not have a way of getting a national military policy today. What is our policy? If my admiral friend can state it, I would like to hear it.

Senator Nunn. Admiral, you have a chance to tell us what our policy is.

General Taylor. And if I may just follow up on my thought, there is in our organization no place where a decision is made as to what the strategic capabilities of our forces should be. What are the strategic tasks that require Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines in any given combination? That should be fundamental, because that would then answer so many questions that you gentlemen are faced with in the budget. What is strategically important? What is the relative importance?

That kind of analysis has never been done. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC together are guilty of not carrying out the roles assigned to them by law. The policymaking system is not working, and it calls for change.

Senator NUNN. All right, let me ask you this, General Taylor. Is there a point we could look back to in the history of this country where we could say that it did work, that the mechanism was there, and the people were there, and all the things blended together so that we really did have a national strategy that—well, let us strike the last. Just a national strategy.

Can we look back in our history to any point where we have functioned the way you would envision that we should function?

General TAYLOR. I do not think we ever have. I would say no. That does not forgive us today, because the danger has changed. The time factor has changed. The complexities of weapons have changed.

Senator NUNN. Would it be fair to say that we were able to get away with this lack of strategy in the past because of overwhelming advantages, and that that margin for error has now diminished? Would that be accurate? We have a need for it now more than ever?

General TAYLOR. Well, I am not sure. I would say that one test of the adequacy of our situation is whether our command structure from the President down is organized in the way it should be in time of war. We cannot afford to have it in time of peace in a way designed to meet our customs and our predilections. We must recognize the fact that the time factor requires us to be organized for a war even when it is not immediately in sight.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

General Jones, can you look back at any point that you are familiar with in history and say that we had the kind of mechanism for strategy and its implementation that you would believe adequate?

General JONES. Probably the closest was in World War II, when there was a clear objective of what we were trying to accomplish, that priority would go to Europe over the Pacific, and the strategy—there were great problems in execution of that strategy and integration of effort down below, but that is the closest we come to have a clear strategy.

There is a national strategy in writing today. I think what we are trying to point out, we who are criticizing it, it tends to be so all-encompassing and so broad that it is all things to all men, and would require far, far more resources than the Nation is willing to provide, and therefore it does not have a meaningful impact on what is done within defense.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, let me ask you this question. Recently President Reagan stated, and I hope I can quote him accurately here, "In virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage over the United States." Do you agree with that assessment?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. All right. Tell us where you disagree, if you would.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I believe that in strategic nuclear forces we still retain essential equivalence. I do not want to sound as if that we should rest on our oars, because I think we are passing through equivalence, and the treads are that the Soviets are soon going to gain a measurable and useful strategic superiority.

I believe that we still have a very small edge in maritime superiority. But again, I am terribly concerned about the trends unless something is reversed. The Soviets are going to gain maritime superiority unless we maintain the current program of a 600-ship Navy.

I believe that in mobility forces are probably about even. This is a great shame, because up until recently we were so far superior to the Soviets in force mobility. This represents our ability to respond to crises around the world which threaten our most vital security considerations, getting there with the necessary forces soon enough to resolve those crises in our favor.

I think we have lost that capability.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, do you agree with that statement by the President? "In virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage over the United States."

General JONES. No, sir, I do not agree with that.

Senator NUNN. General Taylor, do you agree with that?

General TAYLOR. It is impossible to say yes or no. In the case of strategic weapons, the question is, can we destroy all the targets necessary for deterrence as we understand that need? I would say yes, we have. In the case of conventional forces, no one can say who is superior without gratification. You have to say where and for how long. For example, would we ever want to be superior on the Baltic? Or on the Black Sea and many other places on the Soviet perimeter?

Senator NUNN. So this gets back to your saying that we do not have a strategy against which to measure.

General TAYLOR. That is my next comment. We need to know which one of these threats to our overseas interests are of such importance that we must prepare their military protection. Where are these threats and interests? And then when we know we can then decide what forces we need, and where we are dangerously inferior.

Senator NUNN. Senator Tower, I think my time has expired. I am sure I took longer.

Chairman TOWER. I just wanted to ask one question. Is there not some danger in our prioritizing the threat areas to which we would respond in the event of a crisis? That is to say, if we say we will respond in areas *X*, *Y*, and *Z*, but will not respond in areas *A*, *B*, and *C*, do we not virtually concede the Soviets an advantage in those areas? Is there not a certain danger in that?

First, General Taylor, and then I would ask General Jones and Admiral Holloway to comment.

General TAYLOR. Well, first, the places where we think we could not intervene we should not publish in the newspaper. We certainly should know where they are for all practical purposes of designing our forces, and you gentlemen should know in providing the necessary funds for strategic purposes. It should be clearly understood that we must not get too far from home any more without strong allies because the world is no longer our oyster, although we have behaved as if it were ever since World War II to the present time.

Chairman TOWER. General Jones?

General **Jones**. Mr. Chairman, I would not recommend cutting the strategy to fit the cloth of the forces in the sense that it was tried in 1950 with Korea and put Korea outside of our sphere of interest. I think that to a great extent prompted the actions by the North Koreans. So I am not suggesting that we have a strategy that does that sort of thing.

The problem is that our strategy does not lead to coherence of programs; what should we emphasize. As a result, we have grossly neglected mobility. We have an army far bigger than we can move any place. We have lots of similar problems. National strategy has to be translated into a military strategy and then into coherent programs that will come out at the end with the greatest capability to meet first the most critical threats and second have some flexibility to meet other threats around the world.

The total process is deficient. We can have a perfect strategy, but unless we followed through the whole process, including adequate budget support, that strategy would be for naught, but I would not announce to the world that area *X* is undefendable, or that it is outside of our sphere of influence. If we did, it may promote what we did in Korea in 1950.

Chairman **Tower**. Admiral Holloway?

Admiral **Holloway**. I think General Jones and I are probably now closer to agreement after having heard that last statement. I believe that there is a coherent strategy. You can see it in a nonclassified version in Secretary Weinberger's annual posture statement, which I thought was excellent.

What most people cannot see and should not see is the defense guidance. It is top secret, limited distribution, and is intended only for the National Command Authority and the Chiefs. And I have not seen the current version, but people in whom I have confidence tell me that it is a good document. Where we tend to break down, and on this I agree with General Jones, is in the translation of strategy into the hardware of forces and weapons.

One of the main difficulties in that process are the swings in philosophy. Just since 1978 our approach to a national strategy has had a major shift. In 1978 we said we were not going to be policing the world. We were withdrawing from worldwide commitments.

Now our emerging strategy is saying that the United States is going to respond to contingencies around the world which do constitute a grave threat to our most vital security interests, and that we intend to respond to those crises whenever and wherever they occur with the forces necessary, and in a timely manner to resolve them in our favor. The rapid deployment force and the lightening up of Army forces are all part of that new strategy.

But I submit that the translation of the philosophy of a national military strategy into hardware and forces is a timely process. And if the philosophy swings back and forth with frequency, then we really have problems. I think we are suffering from those problems today.

Chairman **Tower**. Admiral Denton—Senator Denton. I'm sorry. Being only a chief petty officer, I am awed by rank. I recognize Senator Denton, if he has any questions.

Senator DENTON. We all know your real rank on this committee, and respect your knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

I personally was on the floor, as I mentioned, where most of the Members during most of this time have been and therefore I am not in a position at this time to ask questions based on the testimony. I was just getting briefed by my staff representative here.

I would like to give my greetings and respects to General Taylor, General Jones, and Admiral Holloway, whom I have respected all through the latter part of my career, and in two of the three cases all through my career. And I would defer my opportunity to ask questions until later, if that is possible, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I think we need to conclude the hearings. General Jones has an urgent requirement to be elsewhere.

I want to thank all of you gentlemen for appearing today. I apologize for the constant interruptions. We are engaged in trying to do the people's business over on the Senate floor, whether the people are aware of it or not, and we had to make several votes.

I do thank you all for coming. We may be wanting to talk to each of you again at some point as we try to build a record on this issue. This is only the first in what I expect to be a number of hearings that will be continued into the 98th Congress. Again, I thank you gentlemen for your appearance.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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